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PR£FAC£
The foreign policy of a country cannot be treated as an
absolute entity, separate from all other activities of life.
Social problems, political institutions, economic situations,
and religious and cultural affairs all contribute to the shaping
of a nation's foreign policy. Since diplomatic history prima-
rily deals with the relations between different states, any
significant change in the internal or external policies of one
state would necessarily have its effect on other states. It is
impossible, therefore, to study British foreign policy in the
last decade of the eighteenth century in regard to the First and
Second Coalitions without dealing with the affairs and problems
which formed the foreign policies of the other member states of
the Coalitions. Equally important is the fact that these Coali-
tions were essentially formed for the purpose of checking, by
force, France's revolutionary principles and rising strength.
Therefore, light should be shed on those most important develop-
ments of the Revolution and their effect on the European pol-
itics. Also, since the major purpose of the formation of these
Coalitions was a military one, it becomes necessary to deal with
the military operations that determined the development end fate
of these Coalitions.
The aim of this work is not to give an extensive set of
facts concerning the diplomatic relations or to dwell upon the
details of the military operations. This information can be
found in numerous sources. This work is, instead, an attempt
to study the factors that influenced the Britiah foreign policy
in this period, the elements which decided its trends, and the
forces which controlled its execution. Still more important is
to determine the causes which led the British foreign policy in
that period to that particular course of action. Also, this
work attempts to study the attitudes and policies of the major
Suropean states in regard to those Coalitions.
Most of the forces that directed European diplomatic rela-
tions in the last decade of the eighteenth century were only a
continuation of the policies that had been developed over a
long period. Sach of the major European powers had its tradi-
tional line of policy in regard to its own sphere of Interests
and its relations with other countries. The study of these
different lines of policy and their conflict or agreement with
each other is essential in order to fulfill the purpose of this
work. Since the major task of this work is to deal with British
foreign policy, it is natural then to put more stress on the
diplomatic relations between each of the continental powers and
England. Having given attention to all these points. It Is hoped
that this work has achieved its purpose.
THE BACKGROUND
Uneasy Peace
Throughout the eighteenth century Europe was in an almost
continuous state of war. England was making her colonial empire,
and Prussia and Russia were developing dynastic states by means
ttaat night be described as systematic warfare. Spain was losing
much of her empire and, accordingly, her seat as a first rate
power. Although France emerged in the second half of the eight-
eenth century as the feared power In Europe, her energies were
divided between building up a colonial empire overseas and being
a predominate power in Europe. Thus, the periods of general
peace in this century were as short as they were few. Distrust
and Jealousy were a general rule in the relations between the
different European states. Each was only too ready to take of-
fense at the other's real or supposed strength and prosperity.
The Treaty of Versailles, sealed in November, 1783, brought
a definite close to the American war, in which Great Britain had
been engaged for more than seven years. A new epoch of the
American continent, Europe, and Great Britain was opened with
the frank and restricted recognition of the sovereignty and
Independence of the United States of America. This recognition
was stated In the first article of the Treaty of Versailles.
Art. 1: His Britannle Majesty acknowledge the said
United States to be free, sovereign and independent
states, that he treats with them as such; and for himself,
his heirs, and successors, relinquishes all claims to the
government propriety, and territorial rights of the same,
and every part of thereof, and that all disputes which
might arise in future on the subject of boundaries of
the said United States, may be prevented, it is hereby
2,
that the following are and shall be their boundaries....
The Treaty of Versailles was not one but four separate trea-
ties between Great Britain on the one hand and the United States,
France, Holland, and Spain, respectively, on the other. France,
although triumphant, did not obtain as many valuable concessions
«s she had expected. Her gains were in the West Indies where she
received Saint Pierre and Miquelon, and in Africa where she re-
ceived Senegal and Gorce. She also took Tobago in exchange for
Dominica and restored her commercial stations in India. In addi-
tion, England aclcnowledged the rights of the French to the fish-
eries in Newfoundland. Spain received Minorca and iiast Florida,
while Great Britain regained the Bahama Islands and got the right
of cutting log wood in the Bay of Honduras. England, however,
held firm on the question of Gibraltar and refused to barter it
for any valuable compensation that the Spanish offered. Holland
2
recovered all her colonies with the exception of Negapatam.
Great Britain emerged from the American war without allies.
Her prestige and place in the councils of Europe had sunk to the
lowest point in centuries. The British finance was demoralized
and disorganized. Ireland and India had called for legislatl/e
treatment, and commerce was strangled by an antiquated fiscal
code that fostered smuggling and bred administrative incompe-
tence. Economic reform had not proved to be a controversial
^Hansard's Debates ( 1066-1918 ). XXIII, (New York: Readex
Microprint, 1961), p. 355.
nbid .. XXIII, pp. 359-369.
issus between warring parties, but an Imperative political and
financial neceeslty.^ The anxiety and disappointment which pre-
vailed in Great Britain as a result of the loss of the United
States were better expressed by George III in his speech to the
Parliament in December, 1732.
In thus admitting their separation from the crown
of these kingdoms, I have sacrificed every consideration
of my own, to the wishes and opinion of my people. I
make it my humble and earnest prayer to Almighty God,
that Great Britain may not feel the evils lAlch might
result from so great a dismemberment of the empire, and,
so America may be free from those calamities which have
formerly proved in the mother country how essential ,
monarchy is to the enjoyment of constitutional liberty.
If Great Britain had suffered much from the Aaerican war,
her opponents had suffered also. France and Spain had achieved
a costly revenge, while Great Britain could more easily pay for
her defeat than they could for their victory, France's state of
finance was a difficult position, and this was one of the major
reasons for the Revolution. If America's independence was a
hard blow to the British Empire, it was also a notable example
to the colonies of the other powers. American freedom was not
so satisfactory a prospect to Spain. France, Indeed, did not
welcome the large concessions with which Great Britain sought to
conciliate the feelings of Spain. Meantime, Spain was not able
to close her eyes to the fact that she had lost a part of her
Sir Charles Grant Robertson, England Under the Hanoverians
(New York: Methuen and Co., LTD., 1958. 1st ed. 1911), pp. 306-
307.
^Hansard's Debates , ofi. £it . , XXIII, p. 207.
own country, Gibraltar.^
The Treaty of 1783 was a sign confronting England showing
the need for a new departure, a healing and constructive policy.
The popular voice, expressed In the election of 17^4, like the
King's friends and the orthodox opposition, expressed a convic-
tion that the new Ideals and the new methods would come only, if
at all, from a new man. This man would be William Pitt. Pitt
inherited from his father. Lord Chatham, not only his famous
name but also many of his qualities and ambitions as well. From
an early age Pitt aroused great expectations. He Inherited from
his father the gift of oratory, a high degree of patriotism, the
serene confidence in his capacity to lead the proved spirit that
neither feared nor flattered flesh. Events proved him to be
neither a great administrator nor a great war minister; but as
a leader of a party and as a parliamentary master in the eight-
eenth century, he was surpassed by no other leader. This ambi-
tion was unlimited. He loved power with the same dynamic passion
as his devotion to parliamentary life. At the age of twenty-five
he became a prime minister. When he died in I8O6, he had been at
the head of the government for a longer period than any other
British statesman except Walpole. No political leader before or
since his day has spent such a brief period of political life out
^E. A. Benians, "The Beginning of the New Empire, 1783-
1793," in John Holland Rose et al., editors, The Cambridge
History of the British Empire II, (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1940), pp. 3-4. This will hereafter be cited as
Benians.
of office. He dominated Parliament as well as the crown and
country by the sheer force of his character and ability which
placed him In a lonely class by himself.
l^hen the Marquis of Rockingham had taken North's place as
Prime Minister In March, 1782, and when the new Prime Minister
died in July of the same year, Shelburne became head of the ad-
odnlstration. Shelburne's major task was to carry on the nego-
tiations for the preliminaries of the Peace of Versailles. In
February, 1783, Fox and North formed a coalition and opposed the
terms of the peace. Thus, the Shelbume government lost its
majority in the House of Commons, and the King waa forced to give
office to coalition leaders. In November, 1783, the new govern-
ment of Noirth and Fox accepted almost unchanged the peace which
they had condemned. The King was not pleased with the conduct
of this administration, and when Fox's India Bill was defeated
in the House of Lords, the King seised the opportunity and dis-
missed the government. Pitt was chosen as the new Prime Minister
in December, 1783* He carried on the government for a few weeks
in minority; finally he asked the King to dissolve Parliament.
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In the new Parliament, Pitt gained a substantial majority.
It is doing Pitt no injustice to say that in the earlier
years of his administration he was concerned more with domestic
questions than with foreign affairs. The Peace of 1783 gave him
the time necessary to repair his vessel so that at some future
"Robertson, oe. £it., pp. 307-308.
'Benians, ££. cit .. p. U.
date the ship might once more take to the seas. He had, indeed,
to restore vital warmth and consistence to the shattered frag-
ments of empire. He had, therefore, at once applied himself to
place on a permanent and workable footing those complicated
relations with Ireland which had been hurriedly adjusted under
the pressure of defeat in America. He had to strain every nerve
to restore the ruined finance of the country which was always
the object of his political life.
In the financial field Pitt was the pupil of Adam Smith.
The chief characteristics of the budget of 178if were the follow-
ing: the raising of revenue and the crippling of smuggling by
a scientific rearrangement of the tariff; the duty on tea was
reduced from nineteen per cent to twelve and a half per cent;
the excise on home produce was raised; the duty on imported
brandy was lowered; and the deficit in revenue was met by a
variety of new taxes. Next year the deficit had dropped to
1,000,000 pounds, which Pitt met by a loan from the Bank of
England and by throwing the net of taxation still wider. These
measures led up to the famous Sinking Fund of 1786. The nation
was led to believe that this would, by automatic magic, extin-
guish the national debt. The fund was to be created by the
establishment of a Board of Commissioners, independent of Par-
liament and Ministry, to whom 1,000,000 pounds was assigned
Lord Rosebury, Archibald Philip Primrose, Pitt . (London:
MacKillan and Co., 1893, 1st. ed. 1891), p. 99. This will
hereafter be cited as Rosebury, Pitt .
annually for the purchase of stock. Each million would thus
accumulate at compounded interest, and simple arithmetic seemed
to prove that only a limited period of time was required to
amortize the total dead weight of debt. The scheme certainly
was effective when taxation could provide the annual 1,000,000
pounds from sio-plus revenue; but when it became necessary to
provide the 1,000,000 pounds by borrowing at a higher rate of
interest, the result was dead loss and, in principle, pure
financial quackery. Pitt's mastery of principles and details
was exemplified to the full in his budget for 1787. The Bill
for the Consolidation of the Customs and Sxcise laid the basis
of the Consolidated Fund which is the core of the modern British
financial system. A single tax was laid on each item. Simpli-
city, efficiency, and cheapness in collecting taxes were the
features of the new rate book of tariff.^
Pitt was eager to conclude a commercial treaty with France
so England could find new markets for her industrial products;
and, more important, such a treaty could possibly assure the
peace between the two countries for a long time. England needed
such a tine to strengthen and rebuild herself in order to be
ready for any future conflict. France, on the other hand, had
been pacific after the Peace of Versailles. Financial diffi-
culties would not allow her to take advantage of her superior
position. After the peace the French reforming ministers found
'Robertson, aa. ctt .. pp. 313-3H.
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full occupation at home. Hence, France aewaed to be anxious to
deal easily with England and not to pursue her advantage. Ver-
gennes, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, apparently wished
England to continue her overseas activities and to devote her
energies to commercial and colonial schemes rather than to brood
about her losses and her desired revenge regarding the American
war.^^ These circumstances paved the ground for signing tha
Treaty of Navigation and Commerce on January 26, 1787, which was
favorable to the British industry. The duties on hardware,
cutlery, cabinetware, coal, and cotton and woolen nanufactures
were lowered considerably for the advantage of England. French
wines were not to pay higher duty than what those of Portugal
were paying at that time. Articles of dress, luxuries in which
France had the advantage, were subject to high duties. The iapor«
tation of silks, or cotton and woolen goods mixed with silk,
which are advantageous to France, was prohibited in both coun-
tries. This treaty was advantageous to French agriculture, but
it was a disadvantage to her industry. ^^ Hence, it is rather
surprising to see that this treaty was net with bitter attack in
the House of Commons by Fox, the leader of the opposition. Fox
said that he would never be convinced that France was sincere
when she professed by this treaty to be the friend of Great
Britain. In Hansard's Debates one could find the following
passage about this speech of Fox:
|-^Benians, ££. cii., p. 31.
^^Hansard '8 Debates . ££. £ii., XIVI, pp. 237-238.
uHe undoubtedly, Mr. Fox said, would not go the
length of asserting that France was and must remain the
unalterable enemy of Great Britain, and that there was
not a possibility for any circumstances to occur, under
which France might not secretly feel a wish to act emical-
ly with respect to this kingdom. France was the natural
political enemy of Great Britain. What made her so?
It was the overwhelming pride and boundless ambition of
France, her invariable and ardent desire to hold the sway
of Europe
Mr. Fox concluded that France was the natural foe
of Great oritain, and that she wished by entering into a
commercial treaty with us to tie our hands and prevent us
from engaging In any alliance with other powers. 12
Fox was not alone in his opposition. He was supported by
other Whig leaders such as Burke, Sheridan, and Francis. Pitt,
however, was able to secure the necessary majority to seal the
treaty. 13
These views and opposition of Fox, although they might on
the first viewing seem strange, are not, in fact, more than true
reflections of the general British opinion of the time. The
enmity, rivalry, and jealousy which existed between the two
countries for a long time could not be forgotten and smoothed
by a commercial treaty. England could not forget her losses in
the American war and accept the French supremacy in Europe. In
fact, while signing this treaty, England was working to her ut-
most to abandon her Isolationist position and to find allies in
order to check the French rising power.
^
^Ibid .. XXVI, pp. 1786-1788.
^^Rosebury, Pitt , ofi. £ii., p. 87.
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From Isolation to Triple Alliance
Pitt chose as his Secretary for Foreign Affairs the Marquis
of Carmarthen (afterwards Duke of Leeds). Carmarthen's policies
followed the same traditional British line. He regarded France
as a natural enemy to England, and he wanted to adjust the bal-
ance of power in Europe to the advantage of England. He felt
England should depart from her present position of isolation and
regain her influence in the councils of Europe, which she had
lost as a result of the American war. The attitude of Pitt con-
cerning foreign policy was tying Carmarthen's hands and not al-
lowing him to follow the active and dynamic foreign policy in
which he believed. This general indifference of Pitt toward
foreign policy in the period prior to the French Revolution could
be explained in two ways. On the one hand, Pitt might have
thought that the true interest of England lay in the peaceful
development of the French commerce and industry, which Louis XVI
and his ministers wished to encourage. By this policy Franc*
would have been hindered in her axpansionistic passions which
were dangerous to the European order. On the other hand, more
probably Pitt recogniJsed the danger of isolation to Great Britain,
but he saw that there were more important things than forming
alliances and recovering prestige abroad. Possibly he felt that
Great Britain had to strengthen her economy, and then she could
easily find the needed alliance—when her alliance would be
worthwhile to the other powers. In either way, Pitt did not
believe, like Carmarthen and the other British diplomats, that
13
there was an immediate danger to i^ngland and that a war was
Inevitable. ^^
Three alliances had goyemed Europe in the 1780's, and
England was excluded in all three. The first alliance, which
had been foi*med in 1756, was between France and Austria and was
regarded in England as a menace to the peace of Europe. It was
Carmarthen's principal objective to put an end to it. If Car-
marthen had possessed more political insight, he would have seen
that the alliance between France and Austria was unnatural and a
hindrance to the actions of both rather than one of mutual assist-
ance. Beside this Franco-Austrian alliance, there was the
Bourbon Family Compact between France and Spain which had shown
itself to be dangerous to England during the American war. The
Austro-Russian agreement of May, 17dl, was another important
diplomatic Instrument in directing the European politics in the
1780' s and was more important in determining the future of the
Eastern Question. This agreement was not expressed by means of
formal documents but simply by mutual exchange of letters between
Joseph II of Austria and Catherine II of Russia. Austria acknow-
ledged Russia's possession of European Russia and her dominions
in Poland. In return, Austria received a guarantee for her
dominions, including those in the Low Countries and in Poland.
^^Oscar Browning, "The Foreign Policy of Pitt to the Out-
break of war with France." Cambridge Modem History VIII . planned
by the Late Lord Acton, A. h. Ward et al., editors. (New York:
The MacMillan Company, 1904), pp. 277-278. This will hereafter
be cited as Browning.
••^Robertson, o^. cl^.. p. 319.
uAustria agreed that if war would be declared between Russia and
Turkey, she would Join Russia and would support the campaign
with troops equal in number to those of Russia. This agreement
was directed primarily against Turkey, but also indirectly
against Prussia, the traditional enemy of Austria. Prussia was
16
suspicious about this agreement but did not know its contents.
The Emperor also hoped that this agreement would enable him to
realize his favorite scheme. He wanted to exchange the Austrian
Ketherlands for Bavaria in order that the dominions of Austria
would become geographically unified. Such a scheme, if realised,
would make Austria much stronger. This would never please Prus-
sia, who aroused the other Uerman states in opposition to this
scheme.^'
Frederick the Oreat of Prussia—not a part of these alli-
ances—watched the Austrian Emperor and decided to maintain
communications between Berlin and St. Petersburg and to remain
coldly hostile toward England. Also outside this system of
alliances was the United Provinces that had participated in the
campaign against Great Britain during the American war. The
Northern Baltic states also were not attached to any of these
alliances; but because of former conflicts, Sweden was hostile
^^Arthur Hassall, T^je Balance of Power 1715-1785
,
(New York
The MacMillan Company, 1900, 1st ed. 1196), pp. 360-361.
17charles Ross, ed., Correspondence of Charles First
Marquis Cornwallls I, (London: John Murray, Albemarle Street,
1859)
,
pp. 191-192. This will hereafter be cited as Cornwallls
Correspondence .
X5
to Russia, and Denmark held the same attitude toward Sweden.
In London, Carmarthen regarded the formation of some other
alliance favorable to England as an absolute necessity In order
to counterbalance the formidable Bourbon Alliances. He looked
at Prussia as the most possible and desirable power that England
should try to draw to her side. Another possibility was by
separating Austria from France and a consequential agreement
with Russia. In either case the minor states, like Denmark,
Sweden, and particularly Holland, might be attracted to the new
British system. To obtain such an objective the British diplo-
mats knocked on the doors of all European courts, but until 17^6
Carmarthen's efforts produced little. These met some success in
Denmark. His labors in Vienna, Moscow, and Berlin met with no
19response.""
At this time, however, events occurred which created a
diplomatic climate more favorable to British policies. Vs'hile
Bjigland and France in the 1780 's were wishing for a lengthy
peace, other eastern European states were restless and were pre-
paring for fflllitary campaigns. The Austrian Netherlands and
Holland, Poland and Turkey, and the Black Sea and the Baltic
became the scenes of diplomatic activities and fields of military
conflicts. Russia in the earlier part of the century had not
only advanced her boundaries by the partition of Poland and by
taking several provinces on the Baltic from Sweden, but also had
IdRobertson, og. clt .. p. 319.
^
^Ibid .. p. 320.
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conquered all of the Crimea and had become a permanent power in
the Black Sea. This advance had been aided by England and
France's preoccupation with western European and colonial af-
fairs. They gave little attention to the growing dangers in the
20
•astern waters. In addition, Turkey was an ancient ally of
France, who used her as a checking force in her conflicts with
Austria. Although England did not hold as good a position as
France did in Turkey in the 1770' s, she was not on unfriendly
terms with Turkey. However, Russia became a natural ally to
England. England had helped Russia in building up her naval
force; but in the 17d0'8 Russia had become so strong and dan-
gerous to the balance of power that England looked with fear as
21to what the future might bring to the European scene.
The foreign policy of Catherine II was simply to destroy
the Turkish empire and to advance Russian interests in the west
and, more important, to the south. She looked forward to the
capturing of Constantinople and to the establishment of a Greek
Empire on the eastern coasts of the Mediterranean. Hence, when
the Turks in August, 1787, thinking that the western European
countries would help them, sent Russia a manifesto, Catherine
at once seized the opportunity and declared war. The Austrian
Emperor, in accord with his agreement with Russia, soon followed
suit and in February, 1788, declared war against Turkey.
2°A. T. Mahan, The Influence ^f Sea Powers Upon the French
Revolution and Europe 1793 -1312 . I. (Boston: Little Brown and
Company, ISWT, p. 10.
2llbid.. p. 12.
'^''Leo Gershoy, From Despotism to Revolution 1763 - 1789 .
(New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1944), pp. 189-190,
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Although the Turks were successful In defending their positions
against the Austrlans in 1788, they were defeated by the Russians
in the east. In 1789 the Turks lost almost all the battles
fought in Europe or in the Black Sea area and were saved from
total annihilation of their empire only by the internal disturb-
ance in the Austrian empire and by the diplomatic Interference
of the Triple Alliance to their advantage.''
Joseph II was a man of high abilities and possessed a pas-
sion for justice and reform in his domestic policy. In his
foreign policy his mind was filled with wide schemes, and he
labored tirelessly to obtain for his empire a better seat in the
councils of Europe. Most of his domestic and foreign policies,
however, proved to be failures, and this was due to the reckless-
ness and impatience that characterized his whole career. He
undertook tasks far beyond his abilities and means, and his
history is, therefore, only the long and sorrowful story of a
prince animated by the best intentions, who failed in much of
what he had attempted. ^^
One outstanding example showing these characteristics of
Joseph II is his project in the Low Countries. Fortified by his
alliances with France and Russia, Joseph II thought the time was
ripe for him to solve his problems in the Low Countries. In
November, 1783, he decided to make a revision on the Barrier
Treaty of 1718 which gave the Dutch the right to keep the
23Hassall, ££. £!£., pp. 385-386.
24ibid .. p. 351.
1<
Scheldt River closed to the navigation of any foreign country.
The opening of the Scheldt was not only against the vital
interests of the Dutch but also Great Britain, who always had
regarded the opening of the river for international navigation
as a threat to her security. England supported Holland diplo-
atically, but she was in no position to support her materially.
When the Dutch refused to open the river, two Austrian ships
sailed up the river. The Dutch fired upon one and captured the
other. The Imperial Ambassador left The Hague, and the Dutch
Ambassador was withdrawn from Vienna. An Austrian army was
collected in the Austrian Netherlands, the Dutch found it dif-
ficult to resist this army. The Dutch, nevertheless, opened
25
their sluices, flooded their country, and prepared for war.
Russia supported the Smperor, but France disappointed him and
supported Holland. King Frederick of Prussia naturally opposed
the Baperor, and general European war seemed imminent. This war
was averted by aa armistice mediated by France, that was followed
by an agreement, signed in November d, 17^5 > that settled the
dispute between Holland and Austria. According to this agree»
nent the Scheldt was to remain closed, and the Emperor gave up
his other claims regarding some of the Dutch bordering fort-
resses. In return, the United Provinces was to pay the £mperor
ten million florins, and France volunteered to pay one-half of
it.^^ Thus, this project of Joseph II was met with complete
^^Browning, ££. £ii. , p. 2d.
2°KiHiam Kdward Lecky, History of England in the Eighteenth
Century . V (New York: D. Appleton and Company, l393). pp. 355-
357.
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failure. France, on the other hand, was the major gainer and
was rewarded for her mediation by an alliance with the Dutch.
This alliance which was signed In Fontalnebleau on the 15th of
July, 1787, was unrestricted and effective anywhere In the world.
Art. IX. Should one of the high contracting; parties
be involved in a war, (which God forbid I) wherein the
other should be In a situation to engage directly, they
shall arrange together the plan of operation to be pur-
sued, In order to Injure the common enemy and oblige him
to make peace; and they shall not discern or receive prop-
ositions fcr peace or truces, except with the consent of
both. 27
Article XI of the treaty binds each party to not become
Involved in the future with any treaty or agreement that might
be contrary to this treaty. Also, there were articles in this
treaty concerning the commerce between the two countries, in
which each pledged to treat the other as the most favored
nation. ^° Undoubtedly the conclusion of this treaty was a
great viotoi>y to France and to Vergennes.
One of the oldest and closest allies of Orsat Britain and
also one of the chief maritime powers of the world had thus de-
tached herself from all her British connections, thrown her
influence in support of France, and virtually became a member
of the Bourbon Family Compact. Hence, the balance of power that
Britain had for so long labored and maintained had now been
27
Department of Sta te , The Diplomatic Correspondence of the
Sited States of America From the Signing of Definitive TreatyPeace 10th September . 1783 . to the Adoption pf the Constitu-
tion March i, 1789 . JIJ
.
(Washington: John C. Rives, 1855, 1st
ed. 1837), pp. 497-498. Hereafter cited as Diplomatic Correspond -
ence .
28ibld., Ill, p. 49«.
so
shifted to her disadvantage. At the time of Vergennes* death In
February, 1787, France was not only the first land power but also
had become, by the conclusion of this treaty, the first sea
power. France's prestige at this time was high. Holland, Spain,
and Austria were her allies; Catherine II was anxious for her
friendship, and early in 1737 she concluded a commercial treaty
29
with Louis XVI. ' Before his death Vergennes had inflicted a
severe blow on the British position and prestige in F.urope by
the conclusion of this treaty with the United Provinces. The
question was how long France would keep this prestige after Ver-
gennes' death. Events would prove that Vergennes' death was a
great loss to the French diplomacy and prestige.
The death of Frederick the Great in August, 1786, and the
rapid development of the crisis in the Netherlands ushered in
the change that England longed to see in the European diplojsatic
atmosphere. The successor of Frederick was his nephsw, Frederick
William II, who was strongly attached to England. In the United
Provinces the Republican party, "The Patriots", aided with French
gold and diplomacy, decided to compel the Stadholder, William V,
to resign his hereditary office tr at least to withhold his
powers. If they had succeeded, the United Provinces would have
become a part of France in all but name. The province of Holland
in September 1787, suspended the Stadholder from his functions.
Including his military powers. The carriage of the Princess
^^Lecky, ofi. sil. , V, pp. 356-357.
21
Stadholder, who was the sister of Frederick II, was stopped by
the Hepublican party troops who were now in control of Holland,
and the Princess was treated in an undignified manner. This
incident was to become the spark for a dangerous international
complication. The Princess sent a letter to her brother inform-
ing him of the incident and asking his intervention. The answer
of the Prussian King, with the encouragement of England, was a
threat to march his troops to the United Provinces. Since
France, by her treaty with the United Provinces of 1785, was
pledged to defend that country in ease of war, a general Euro-
pean war seemed inevitable.-' From the beginning of this Dutch
crisis, James Harris (afterwards Lord Malmesbury), the British
envoy to The Hague, put all his energies in order to pave the
ground for the British interest in the United Provinces. He
sent waitings to London about the dangerous development of the
crisis and recommended an effective British policy regarding it.
Pitt, although fearing that these matters might Involve England
in a war that he wanted to avoid, luiderstood the importance and
danger the Dutch crisis night bring to British interests. Hence,
he agreed to send money to the Stadholder party, and Bnglish
officers volunteered to serve in his army.
On September 13, 1787, the Prussian army, under the command
of the Duke of Brunswick, advanced into Dutch territory and
entered Gelderland. At the same time Pitt, in a drastic step.
^ Browning, s£. cit .. p. 385.
3^Ibid .. p. 387.
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wrote to Eden in Paris directing him to get in touch with th«
Court of Versailles and to demand that France abandon her pro-
jects of extending her influence in the United Provinces by
altering its constitution. If the authority of the Stadholder
vias to be preserved, and if the French would not accept these
principles, the question had to be decided by war. Pitt followed
this threat by iraaediate orders for the purpose of hastening the
British military preparations on sea and land. War seemed to be
on the point of breaking out. What helped England in her firm
stand was the rapid advance of the Prussian army. Six days after
its entry, the Republicans were crushed and the Prince of Orange
was able to enter The Hague triumphantly, where he was invested
with every privilege that had been taken from him.^^ Meantime
this rapid advance of Brunswick discouraged France from sending
help to the Republicans. Krance, also, was hampered by her
bankrupt finances, and her ally Austria was fully occupied In
her operations against the Turks. Under these circumstances
France, fearing to take the risk of an action in the field,
looked around for a peaceful solution to her difficult position.
Willlan Grenville was sent from London to Paris to assist Eden
in order to help convince the French to accept the new status quo
in the United Provinces. Their labors resulted in a French dec-
laration in which they declared that the King of France did not
have, and never had, the intention of interfering in the affairs
^'^Lecky, j2fi. sil', V, pp. 358-359.
»of the Republic of the United Provinces; that he retained no
hostile view towards any quarter relative to what had happened
in Holland; and that all warlike preparations should again be
placed on the same footing as that of the peace establishment.''''
This humiliating declaration of France did not only bring
an end to danger of war but also to the French influence in the
Netherlands. It was also a major factor for ending England's
isolation. Throughout the Dutch crisis, the British diplomats
worked zealously to reach an Anglo-Prussian understanding.
These labors were crowned by a defensive alliance between England
and Pinissla that was signed on the iSth of August, 176^.-'^ Also,
the United Provinces were now willing to sign a military alliance
with England, and this was concluded on April 15, 1733. In this
defensive alliance it was stated;
Art. 2. In case either of the high contracting
parties should be hostilely attacked by any European
power in any part of the world whatsoever, the other
contracting party engages to succour its ally as well by
sea as by land, in order to maintain and guarantee each
other mutually in the possession of all the dominions,
territories, towns, places, tranchies and liberties, which
belonged to thera respectively, before the commencement
of hostilities.
Art. 3. Great Britai.. guarantees with the most ef-
fectual manner the Stadholderate as well as the office
of the Hereditary Governor of each province in the serene
House of Orange. 3
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This treaty also defines the number of troops and ships that
each party has to furnish the other in case of war. In this each
'^Robertson, ££. cit .. p. 321.
^'^Hanserd's Debates , og. iii.., XXVIII, p. 1329.
3 ^Ibid .. XXVIII, p. 553.
uparty also pledged to treat the other as the most favored nation
in commercial relations. Shortly thereafter, these two treaties
were converted into one Triple Alliance linking the three coun-
tries together.^ Thus, this Dutch crisis not only marked an
end to England's isolation, but it also brought England into a
powerful European combination with the balance of power once
again in her favor.
Revolution and Reaction
It is almost impossible for the twentieth century observer
to realize the stir the French Revolution made in the eighteenth
century world. For one thing, reactions of all kinds are now
too easily produced and spread. It would seem that even the
Russian Communist Revolution, though it may ultimately have
results even more Important than the French one, has not yet
impressed itself so thoroughly on the Western consciousness as
did the French Revolution. The developments of the French Revo-
lution were quickly carried to all parts of western and central
Europe, and its ideas reached, with much Interest, the ears of
almost everyone in these areas. It is inconceivable that France,
lying in the midst of Europe, could have passed through a great
revolution without influencing her neighbors and without becoming
Involved in war.
The reasons for this widespread interest in the Revolution
are not difficult to discover, and they help throw light on the
^ Diplomatic Correspondence . op . <iXi.'t ^^^t P» ^0^*
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whol« process of change in late eighteenth century Europe. In
spite of her military defeats under Louis XV, France was still
regarded as "the great nation"; her language and arts were still
imitated throughout most of Europe. The middle classes in Eng-
land, in much of urban Germany and in the Rhineland, in northern
Italy, Holland, Belgium, Switaerland, and in much of Scandinavia
had already worked out a way of life with similar grievances
against the privileged classes. The climate of opinion and
idealogy of the philosophies was almost uniform in western and
central Europe. Interests and ideas blended curiously, but
almost identically, in the different countries. Finally the
French Revolution began in a country economically prosperous,
in a Europe which had been reasonably long at peace or, at any
rate, without major international wars, and in an atmosphere of
confidence rare in the history of revolutions.
The British outlook on the French Revolution, in its first
stage, was twofold. First, it was viewed as internal troubles
that would weaken the rival power of England. Second, it was
viewed as a constitutional reform similar to iriiat England had
experienced in her revolution of 16S8. In both cases the
British reaction was favorable to the French Revolution. In
regard to the first point, it is only natural for Great Britain
to be pleased in seeing her "natural foe" engaged in internal
problems that might disable her for a long time. In conjunction
with this idea, Fox, in February, 1790, said in the House of
Commons, "Had France remained in that informidable and tri-
umphant state by which she was distinguished In the year 17S3»
I shall have been the first to applaud such an augmentation."
He described her as now being "in a state which could neither
fill us with alarm nor excite us to indignation." "If fortune,"
he continued, "has humbled the pride and ambition of this mighty
empire, if anarchy ana confusion incidental to such a revolution
has struck her people with inertness and inactivity, why should
we dread her sudden declaration of hostilities?"-'' By the sane
tone Pitt said:
The present convulsions in France must sooner or
later terminate a general harmony and regular order, and
though the fortunate arrangements of such a situation may
make her more formidable, they may also render her less
obnoxious as a neighbour. I hope I may rather wish as an
Englishman for that, respecting the accomplishment of
which I feel myself interested as a man, for the restora-
tion of tranquility in France, though that appears to me
to be distant, vtlhenever the situation of France shall
become restored, it will prove freedom rightly under-
stood, freedom resulting from good order and good gov-
ernment; and thus circumstanced France will stand forward
as one of the most brilliant pioneers of Europe. She
will enjoy that invaluable existence of which I reverate
and to cherish. Nor can I under this predicament regard
with envious eyes an approximation in neighbouring state
to those sentiments which are the characteristic features
of every British subject, and we must aggrandisement those
precious moments of peace and leisure which are before
us. 38
Although in this quotation Pitt tried to show his sympathy
to the French in their struggle for reform, he was not able to
hide his satisfaction with the disableness that France was ex-
periencing.
The reasons and roots of the French Revolution in its early
^^Rosebury, Pitt . ££. fiii., p. 119.
3°Ibid .. p. 120.
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stages were difficult for Englishmen to understand. They did
not anticipate its violence because they knew little or nothing
of its nature and causes. Between 17^9 and 1792 Englishmen
honestly believed that the French were on their way to achieve,
with no undue disturbance, institutions roughly analogous to
those of Great Britain. That was the most they could Imagine.
In fact, in all discussions in England about tha Revolution in
its early stages, the writers maintained the attitude of dis-
interested spectators, and no one had yet imagined that luigland
would be directly concerned. The events were regarded as merely
wonderful phenomena and, therefore, proper subjects for specula-
tion. Not until 1791 was the French Revolution to become a
party question in Kngland. Previous to that time, the newspapers
which represented the view of the party in power, were fully as
extravagant in their praise of the progress of affairs in France
as those which were the organs of the aristocratic Whigs. Both
depreciated the excesses of the populace and approved only of the
underlying purpose which was supported to give rise to them. The
means were to be Justified by the ends.*^'
Mhile the first idea about the political advantages for
England from the Kevolutlon was held, particularly by statesmen,
the admiration to its reformation prospects became far more
popular in England. Statesmen, thinkers, liberal societies were
^'William Thomas LapraUe, Enaland and the French Revolu-
tion 1789-1797 . (Baltimore; The John Hopkins Press, 1909 J
,
pp. 9-10.
uall alike In their enthusiasa for the ReYolution. Such intel-
laota aa Wordsworth, Priestley, Price, Gilbert Wakefield,
Erasmus Darwin, Boulton, Watt, Parr, Robert Hall, and William
Roscoe agreed with the spirit of Fox*s comment on the fall of
the Bastille, "How much it is the greatest event that ever hap-
pened in the world and how much the best."^^ By the close of
1791» the domestic masaas of Franca had bacoma tha vital question
on which the British attention was focused. Several important
events which took place in the latter part of 17^9, in 1790, and
in tha early months of 1791 contributed to this risinc attention
in British political circles and gave active spirit to the demo-
cratic and radical societies.
The real leadership of the new radicalism in Great Britain
was outside the old political circles; it rested with intellec-
tuals closely backed by artisans, shopkeepers, dissenting minis-
ters, school masters, and the like. Support to these radical
societies came not from the poorest nor from the unorganized
labor of the Industrial towns; it came rather from the dis-
senters of the middle class. It cama from man of skill, either
professionals or men conscious both of their ability, and of the
lack of privilege and opportunity. Radicalism was a movement of
political theory, not of economic organization.
In England, chief among tha early reactiona to tha Savolution
^"Robertson, jj^. clt .. p. 361.
*^John Drlnkwater, Charles James Fox . (London: Kmest Benn,
Limited, 1928), p. 289.
^^John Steven '*atson, Ilje Helen of George III 1760- lfll5 .
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965T, p. 357.
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was the publication of three pamphlets. It is not likely that
any one of these productions had the effect which its author
anticipated. Probably not one of them, if left alone, would
have exerted any considerable influence on the English people.
The importance lies in the subsequent events to which they were
necessary preludes, and we cannot understand these events with-
out some knowledge of the nature of the pamphlets and the cir-
cumstances which attended their publication.
The first of these pamphlets to make its appearance was
that of Dr. Richard Price, a nonconformist minister, entitled
^ Discourse on the Love of Country . The author states that the
King of England is the only lawful monarch in the world since he
was chosen by the people as a result of the 1683 revolution. To
him there are three essential rights of man. These are the
liberty of conscience in religious matters, the right to resist
power when abused, and the right to shun one's goveroors and to
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cashier them for misconduct.
Burke's work, Reflection SR iM Revolution in France , was
designated primarily as a reply to Or. Price's pamphlet. As
early as October, 1789| Burke had developed an intense dislike
for the French Revolution, founded largely on the theory that the
Revolution was a result of the agitations of unscrupulous leaders
who were activated by selfish motives. A development of this
idea led him to the conclusion expressed in detail in the Re-
flections that the confiscation of the church lands was the
^^Laprade, oji. cit .. p. 15»
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result of the combined efforts of a literary group and the French
onied Interests. The purpose of the men of letters In France was
to discredit the Christian religion by weakening the church; that
of the capitalists, who held government loans as a part of their
newly acquired wealth and were also envious of the position of
the nobility, was to reimburse themselves for their loans to the
government and to strike a blow at the nobility who controlled
the patronage of the churches. ^ In connection to Price's con-
cept about the legality of the British monarch, Burke rejected
It as "either is nonsense, and therefore neither true nor false,
or it affirms a most unfounded, dangerous, illegal, and uncon-
stitutional position." In answer to Price's concept about the
peoples' rights, Burke says:
This new, and thither to unheard of bill of rights
though made In the name of the whole people, belont^s to
those gentlemen and their faction^" only If the
principles of the Revolution of 1666 are anywhere to be
found. It is in the statute called the Declaration of
Rights. In that most wise, sober and considerate dec-
laration, drawn up by great lawyers and great statesmen,
and not by worn and Inexperienced enthusiasts, not one
word is said, nor one suggestion made, of a general
right "to choose our own govemers; to cashier them for
misconduct; and to form a government for ourselves."'*'
Perhaps it is necessary to observe that in writing this
pamphlet Burke was not primarily concerned with the French Revo-
lution. One of his ambitions was, as he put it, to draw a
J^bM., p. 18.
^'Edmond Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France
,
fcilllam B. Todds, ed., (New York: Rlnehart and Co., Inc., 1959,
1st ed, 1790), p. 19.
j^^He means here Ur. Price and his society of "New Jewery".
*'flurke, j2E' Sil-, PP- 16-17.
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picture of himself and his family. Burke believed that h« waa
a representative of the aristocratic party, and that when hla
pamphlet would be published it would receive the approval of his
associates, since the nobility had been one of the first objects
of attack in France. He believed that if the principles of those
who admired the French Revolution were permitted to spread \m-
opposed in England, one Inevitable consequence would be an attack
on the English nobility, and for that, therefore, ho deserved the
thanks of his aristocratic friends for coming to tnelr defense.
The third of these important publications was ^he Rights Qt
Uaa by Thomas Paina, which was republican in its tone and pur-
poses. Paine boldly affirmed that the "Civil Qovernment" was
synonymous with "Republican Government." He ridiculed Burke's
arguments and developed at even greater length the ideas which he
bad advanced in his previous book. Common Sense . His theories
were based on the doctrine of the Social Contract of Rousseau
that pervaded the political writings of the time. He was, how-
ever, explicit in his opposition both to the monarchy and to the
nobility. This pamphlet was widely read, the notoriety of the
author and the subject insuring a hearing. It received further
advertisement at the hands of both Burke and Pitt, but Its doc-
trines were far too sweeping to receive the approval of any
considerable number. Even the most radical reformers who were
active in England during this period shunned It.^'
^^Lapraae, SH' iii*. PP* 20-21.
^9ibid .. pp. 25-26.
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The activities of the radical organisations—The Society
for Constitutional Information, The Friends of the People, The
London Corresponding Society—were remarkable. The Society for
Constitutional Information, established in 1791, tried to extend
its ideas of parliamentary reform among the literate by spon-
soring editions of radical pamphlets. The London Corresponding
Society, founded in 1790, was similar in its organization to the
Jacoblan Club in France and had daughter associations in many
other British cities. By 1793 it was linked with Manchester,
Stockport, Norwich, and Sheffield. This society was the most
serious attempt to seize control of the forces of discontent and
use them not for passing political advantage but to make a more
equalltarian society. The Corresponding Society was not an in-
novator in ideas; its doctrines were those of Locke spiced with
Rousseau. Their basis was the idea of government as a trust
given by the majority of the people. In detail this was trans-
lated into manhood suffrage, annual parliaments, cheaper govern-
ment, the end of unjust land enclosure, and a simpler legal
system. It was certainly more radical than any proposals hither-
to submitted to Parliament. Equally Important was the fact that
the Corresponding Society was founded by a shoemaker, Thomas
Hardy, and its dues were very low in order to permit people of
low income to become members. Inevitably, the Corresponding
Society looked for France's inspiration. In November, 1792, one
of its leaders had presented addresses from the Society to the
French Convention, with assurance that the British people would
never support war against liberty. The Friends of the People
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was another radical society, although it was less extreme. It
was associated with the Corresponding Society.
More alarming was the situation in Scotland and Ireland.
In Scotland the Scotch Friends of the People societies were very
active. In 1792 riots took place on the King's birthday. As a
result, several eminent leaders v/ere arrested and given severe
sentences. Despite the severe measures of the government, a
convention was held in Edinburgh in November, 1793, and was
attended by delegates from about fifty Scotch and English rad-
ical societies for the purpose of urging parliamentary reform.
The leaders, who arranged for this convention, were seized by
the government and punished with fourteen years transportation
each. By such a firm stand and crushing measures the government
was able to hold In its hand the state of affairs in Scotland.^
In Ireland the case was much worse. The establishment of
Crattan Parliament had quickened the sense of Irish nationality,
and the close historical relationship with France led to an eager
Interest in her fortunes. The fall of the Bastille met much
response in Ireland. The Irish volunteers whose organization
was in opposition to Great Britain and had not entirely been
broken up congratulated France on her achievements. The Catholics
and Presbyterians Joined hands in approving a revolution which
would secure religious equality and parliamentary reform. To
50wat8on, ££. iit., pp. 35^-359.
51g. p. Gooch, "Europe and the French Revolution," The
Cambrluge Modem History, XIII, Lord Acton et al., editors,
(New York: The MacMlllan Company, 1934, 1st ed., 1904), p. 770.
Hereafter cited as Gooch.
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accomplish thcs* objects, by combining into one party all who
dealrad than, Wolfa Tone craated the Society of United Irishaan
in 1791* Soon tha main object of this organization became tha
astablishment of an independent Irish republic. In spite of tha
brutal measures that the British government used in order to
silance tha opposition waves in Ireland, its afforts failed to
giva dacialva raaults. This opposition In Iraland, later during
the war with Franca, became a grave danger to Great Britain.^
As the political thermometer rose In England towards tha
fever point through the years 1792-93 » tha governoant kept
closer watch upon tha political societias but for a long tina
took no action against them. It seems probable that if they
had confined themselves to their professed programs, the govem-
ent would have reaainad passive. The government did not prosa-
cuta those who, in November, 1792, congratulated the French
Convention on the triumph of its armies in Belgium. v;hat then,
were the developments wliich aroused its stem opposition? Thay
were tha events of the French Revolution which seemed to show
tha need of taking decided and early maaauraa against a resolute
and desperate group of radicals. Pitt never declared that under
no circumstances would he oppose a moderate reform of Parliament;
but he did declare that In his view reform was at present highly
perilous, and he resolutely sat himself to the taak of coercing
those agencies who advocated. In his understanding, dangerous
^^IMd., p. 771.
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reforms by unlawful methods.'^
The first persecution that need be noticed here was directed
against Paine for seditious utterances In the Rights of Man . The
attorney general made out a formidable Indictment, whereupon
Paine—then a member of the French Convention—Informed him that
the lun In the moon and the liberties of the people of England
were, In reality, on trial. Several persecutions ensued, with
varying results. Still more frequent were the cases of cursing
the King, sometimes in obscene terms. On November 2S, 1792,
Frost and Burlow presented to the French Convention addresses
sent by the radical clubs in London. One of them ended with the
statement that other nations would soon Imitate France in over-
throwing the monarchy and would "arm ourselves for the purpose of
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claiming the Rights of Man."
The increasing terror in Paris did not only draw England
gradually out of her neutrality, but also made the activities of
the radical societies distasteful and dangerous in the view of
the governing classes and the majority of the populace all alike.
The administration decided now to take decisive measures in
dealing with these societies. Accordingly on May 16, 1793, Pitt
presented the Parliament with the Corpus Act which gave the
government wide authority in dealing with seditious activities,
among which there was the arbitrary arrest. Thomas Hardy was
^^John Holland Rose, The Life ^f William Pitt . (London:
G. Bell and Sons, LTD., 1923T, p. 171. Hereafter cited as
Rose, Pitt .
?^Ibld .. p. 172.
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arrested on May 17, 1793, and later on persecuted. In 1795
the Treasonable Practices Act was passed, which created tougher
measures for treason crimes, dispensed with the proof of overt
acts, and made any writing, printing, preaching, or speaking
inciting to hatred or contempt of the King, the establishment
of government or constitution a high fflisdemeanor. In the same
year the Seditious Meeting Act prohibited meeting of more than
fifty persons without notice to a magistrate. In 1797 the
London Corresponding Society and the Society of United English-
men, Scotsmen, and Irishmen were suppressed under a law which
put unlicensed debating clubs and reading rooms on the same
footing as brothels. Englishmen now had to learn that they
must hold their tongues, and that to express an opinion that
the constitution was not perfect might, and probably would, be
twisted into treason or a seditious act. By such drastic meas-
ures Pitt was able to keep the country united behind the policy
which he, the King, and the nobility believed to be right and
in the Interest of the nation.' It is obvious, however, that
such a firm and strong policy needs to be backed by all the
political forces and parties who consider it necessary for the
safety of the country. Moreover, the dark clouds which covered
the Anglo-French relations by 179^ made such political coopera-
tion in Great Britain a wise and necessary measure to enable the
government to cope efficiently with dangers lying ahead.
55ibid., p. 190.
^ Robertson, jje. clt .. p. 342.
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Pitt's cabinet was far froa being united. Lord Richmond,
one of Pitt's ablest colleagues, was hostile to hla. The Duke
of Leeds had little capacity and was both vain and pompous. It
was not surprising, therefore, to find that he had become a mere
channel and signature stamp for dispatches drafted by Pitt.
Thurlow, the Lord Chancellor, was far from being tntsted by
Pitt, and It was scarcely worth while to summon a meeting of the
Cabinet, for often he would disagree with Pitt. A man of Pitt's
character naturally looked askance at those of his party assoc-
iates who did not submit to his leadership. Therefore, he only
waited for a provocation to rid his cabinet of several members
who were supporters of the King, more than himself, waiting to
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take advantage of the occasion If it should offer Itself.
Hence, when the Duke of Leeds resigned in 1790 as a protest
against Pitt's Russian policy, Pitt at once accepted It, and
Lord William Grenvllle became Secretary for Foreign Affairs.
Grenvllle was Pitt's first cousin and along with Henry Oundas,
the Home Minister, was the confidant of Pitt and assumed much
Influence In shaping his policies.^" Eighteen months later Pitt
dismissed Thurlow who was one of the King's advocates. Those
two steps Increased the personal power of Pitt measurably.
Therefore, it was unthinkable for Pitt to accept the coalition
scheme of the Whig Party which was transmitted to him in Jiine,
1792. This scheme was formed on the grounds that Pitt and Pox
'^Laprade, aij. sii.' i P* 28.
'%08ebury, Pitt , gs.. Sik-t P* HI*
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should hold equal powers, and each of them would assume office
as secretaries of state. Pitt, also according to this plan, had
to resign the treasuryship. As could be expected, Pitt rejected
the idea. King Qeorge III, although feeling the rising crisis
and the need for combining all energies to face it, did not like
the Whig scheme. He hated Fox and regarded him as a personal
enemy; besides, he did not like to make essential alterations in
59his government in order to suit the Whig leaders.
However, the scheme of government coalition showed itself
as more desirable and necessary. Besides, the Right wing of the
Vhig Party, headed by the Duke of Portland, showed its agree-
ableness to cooperate with Pitt, provided Fox was excluded.
Hence, an agreement was reached and Pitt's cabinet was enforced
by new members of the Whig Party in July, 1794. The Duke of
Portland took the Home Department along with the Colonial Office.
Dundas became a Secretary of State for War. £arl Fltzwilliam be-
came President of the Council. The Marquis of Stafford resigned
the Privy Seal in favor of Earl Spencer, and Winham entered the
cabinet as Secretary at War, though this office was not regarded
as one of cabinet rank. By this arrangement the cabinet won
the support of a number of the Whigs, and Fox led a still weaker
minority.
By such formation of the new cabinet, Pitt's power not only
5°Beckle Willson, Geprge III as Monarch and Statesman
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became unshakingly firm, but with this cabinet he could also
better cope with the hard tasks cor.frontlng him at home and on
the continent.
In summary one could say that throughout the eighteenth
century rivalry and enmity continued between the European powers.
The main reason for this rivalry was the ambition of each one to
dominate the continent. Another field of rivalry among the
European maritime powers was in regard to overseas territories.
By the 1780' s France had emerged as the first land power in
Europe, while England assumed the supremacy on the seas. France,
however, divided her energies between two aims—to dominate the
continent and to build a colonial empire. England, meanwhile,
concentrated her energies in the colonial field and was able to
establish the largest colonial empire relative to those of the
other European powers.
England's major line of policy in regard to the continent
was to maintain a balance of power and to prevent any single
power from dominating the continent. Also, she always tried to
keep the United Provinces independent, because England believed
that her security would be endangered if the United Province*
would fall into the hands of any of the large European powers.
By the Treaty of Versailles of 1783, the balance of power had
shifted to France's advantage, and England became isolated,
fojgland, however, was able to retain this balance to her advan-
tage by the conclusion of the Triple Alliance of 1788.
The American war had undermined Britain's strength and
prestige in the Councils of ii^urope. She was in need of a new
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departure and strong leadership. This she found in William Pitt,
who assumed the office of Prime Minister in 17^3 • His energies
were devoted in the 1780' s to reconstructing the country's
finance, which he regarded as the basis for the nation's strength.
He was very successful in this field, and the Anglo-French com-
mercial treaty of 17fi7 illustrated this policy.
The attitude of the British government towards the French
Revolution in its first stages was twofold. On the one hand,
Bngland regarded it as an event which would weaken France and
hinder her expanslonlstic activities. On the other hand, Eng-
land hoped that the Revolution would bring to France some con-
stitutional reforms similar to those of England which were
affirmed in 1688. England hoped that such reforms would limit
the powers of French Kings and hinder their aggressive policies.
In both cases, the Revolution seemed to be favorable to the
British policies.
The British public opinion, in regard to the Revolution in
its beginning, was either enthusiastic or disinterested. After
1789 many radical societies were established in England to preach
the French Revolution doctrines. Some of these societies were
revolutionary and violent in their activities. VJhen violence
and disorder increased in France and when Louis XVI was executed,
the radical societies were suppressed by the British government,
and the Revolution lost many of its sympathizers in England.
.Vi^if-
THK FIRST COAUTION
During th« sarly stages of ths Frsneb Revolution the concept
«f e crusade against France had hardly occurred to the leading
•tatesaen of Kurope. Most of them treated it aerely as internal
French trouble, similar to many others with whose history they
were familiar. History taught them that such a crisis would only
weaken France and, hence, it was an opportunity for the other
powers to profit from that weakness. Soon the progress of the
Revolution gave notion to the European powers that it not only
weakened France, but that its doctrines were dangerous and might
rottse other European people against their kings.
The act of interfering in the affairs of a country In a
state of revolution was not an abnormal proceeding in the inter-
national politics of the time. Such intervention had been ex-
pected in France since the beginning of the Revolution. The
ore each Frenchman was convinced of the greatness of his country
and the importance and Justice of his Revolution, the more he
believed that the European powers would not, for long, leave
France to herself. His newspapers and pamphlets coupled the
praise of liberty with stories of the tyrants plotting against
the Revolution. This aroused his suspicion and touched his
pride. In the streets, cafes, and political clubs of Paris the
designs of European Kings against French liberty had been de-
nounced long before they had begun to take shape in the discus-
sions of foreign statesmen. Naturally, then, the vast majority
of the French nation had decided not to tolerate such interference
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and to try to influence other nations with their revolutionary
ideas in order that they might overthrow their tyrants. This
frame of mind of the French people and this attitude of European
statesmen could explain much of the political and military history
of the era.^l On the other hand, the absence of France as a
large power from the European scene, due to the outbreak of the
Revolution, created a big gap in the balance of power. Hence-
forth a struggle inevitably would take place in order to form a
new one. An amazing series of plans for territorial readjust-
ments were drawn up in the courts of the different powers.
Austria wanted to exchange the Austrian Netherlands for Bavaria.
Prussia would let Austria have Bavaria, compensating in Luxem-
burg and, if possible, Alsace and Lorraine. Catherine II desired
the remainder of Poland. Therefore, she did everything to en-
co\irage Austria and Prussia to spend their energies in a long
struggle with France so she would have a free hand in the East.
It could be concluded, then, that the occurrence of hostilities
between the new France and the old Europe is, on the one hand,
the essence of the nature of the Revolution and, on the other
hand, a result of the nature of the European politics of the
^•^John Harold Clapham, TJie Causes fif tlw Wa£ ^f 1792 . (Cam-
bridge: The Cambridge University Press, ISWT, pp. 26-27.
^^Crane Brinton, A Decade £f Revolution 1789-1799 . (New
York J Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1934), pp. 85-86.
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Neutrality or BaHigerency
The question of intervention in the affairs of France de-
pended mainly on the two principal German powers, who lately had
been steadily becoming closer to each other. The fear for his
possession in the Low Countries of France and for his territories
bounding Prussia led Leopold of Austria to make secret overtures
to Prussia. In these he expressed his Interest in ending the
long enmity and rivalry between the two countries by an alliance.
Frederick William of Prussia, not listening to many of his ad-
visers, responded without delay. It was the object of Prussia to
detach Austria in order to isolate Russia. Leopold felt that
such an alliance would not only safeguard the Austrian domains
but would also give him a strong ally in case circiunstances would
lead to a rupture with France. In their negotiations which
started in Kay, 1791, the question of intervention in France was
discussed. Although the Prussian line of policy was not to in-
volve herself in French affairs, Frederick William, nevertheless,
accepted the idea in principle. This matter, however, was left
to be further discussed by the two sovereigns at Pilnitz. •' The
conference was held in Pilnita in August, 1791, and after dis-
cussing the development of events in France, they agreed to
publish their celebrated Declaration of Pilnita. In this dec-
laration it was stated that the position of the King of France
is a matter of common interest for the European powers. They
^^Lecky, 5£. sil't ^I| PP- 498-499.
uw«re willing to set right that aituation, even by force, if the
other European powers would Join them. ^ This declaration, which
inspired the Imlgrea . bore little or nothing in practice. Since
the Austrian Netherlands was not yet under any threat by France,
the Emperor meant only to warn the French revolutionaries as to
what might happen if the royal family were threatened or injured.
Neither Leopold nor Frederick William was willing to act without
England who, at the time, was far from being agreeable to such
projects.^ The flight of Louis XVI, the insults to which the
French royal family was exposed, and the disposition of the
Geman princes in Alsace from their property made the Emperor
take the question of Intervention more seriously. He started
his preparation by urging Prussia to sign a defensive alliance
with him. His labors were successful, and a treaty between the
two countries was concluded on February 7, 1792. It stipulated
that either power would furnish the campaign with 20,000 troops
if the other were attacked; but this alliance was never put into
practice. On April 12, Austria proposed to Prussia an offensive
alliance to take its place, for the purpose of restoring the
rights of German princes in Alsace, to restore the property and
rights of the Pope In France, to defend the safety of the French
royal family, and to guarantee the monarchical form of govern-
ment in France. Prussia agreed to the idea, and the new alliance
^^Brlnton, 2£. £1^., pp. 8/»-85.
^^5th Earl Phillip Henry Stanhope, Life o£ the Right Honour-
able '*llllan. Pitt . II, {London: J. Murray, 1861-62), p. 13o;
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was concluded which required each power to participate In the
campaign with 50,000 troops. In March, 1792, Leopold died and
his son and heir, Francis II, was less cautious and favored war
more than his father. The French Legislative Assembly, however,
did not give them much time for preparation, and it declared war
against both Austria and Prussia on April 20, 1792.^^
&
,
The Duke of Brunswick commanded the Austro-Prussian forces
which consisted of about 100,000 troops in addition to 5,000
imlgris. Brunswick rapidly advanced through French territory,
pushing back the confused and undisciplined troops of France;
but Brunswick did not take advantage of this disorder to attack
Paris immediately. Instead, he spent much time in reducing the
fortified towns on his way, giving precious moments for the French
to reorganise themselves and bring to the field new levies of
67
troops.
Still a worse mistake was the Brunswick Manifesto. In It he
threatened severe punishment to villages and towns that would
dare to resist the Allied forces. More important, he threatened
that if the King and Queen were not given their freedom at once,
or if they were exposed to the smallest violence, the city of
Paris would be subjected to military execution and exposed to
total destruction. It is natural for such threats, coming from
a foreign general, to arouse the pitch of the French patriotism
Georges Lefebvre, The French Revolution From its Origins
to 1793 f trans. Elizabeth Evanson, (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1962), pp. 221-222. . ,.,..
67iy^., p. 253. ;
and determination to defend their country and not to allow
foreign Interference in their affairs. ^ As Lord Sheffield, a
prominent British politician at the time stated, "The Manifesto
appears to me injudicious and not likely to answer the purposes
of the invaders. If the business is spun out, the French may be
taught to fight. '
' Hence, to the surprise of Isiurope, the French armies under
Dumouriez were able to make a stand at Valmy.'^ Brunswick be-
came aiscouraged, and Dumouriez was able to drive the Allies out
of French territory. By November 14, 1792, Brussels and all of
the Austrian Netherlands surrendered tc the victorious French
armies. In the south a body of French troops defeated the
Sardinians who had Joined the Austro-Prusslan Coalition on the
10th of August, 1792. The French, thereupon, conquered both
71
Nice and Savoy and the territory surrotinding them.
'
What was the attitude of the British government regarding
these eveni^s that were taking place in the continent? From the
beginning of the Revolution, the British government had held to
a policy of strict neutrality. Kngland did not support the
Pilnitz Declaration and when asked to Join the Austro-Prussian
Coalition, her answer was a positive refusal. It should be
^^Stanhope, o£. ill., II, p. 136.
^^i.illiain Men, 1st Baron of Auckland, The Journal and
Correspondence of William . Lord Auckland . II, (London: R. Bentlay
1861-1862), p. 428.
70stanhope, SS.' fiit« t U. PP- 169-171.
71a. Aspinall, ed., The Later Correspondence of George III .
I, (Cambridge: The University Press, 1962), pp. 635-63^^
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observed, however, that Pitt was expecting an easy defeat for
the French. Such a defeat would help him in his internal pol-
icies against the British malcontent and relieve England of her
powerful rival, fjigland, nevertheless, was first to recognize
the French Constitution of 1791. In 1791 Pitt introduced meas-
ures for the purpose of reducing the British military forces on
72land and sea.' Lord Malmesbiu*y, the British Ambassador to
Berlin, wrote on May 26, 1792, "We had declared to all continen-
tal powers that we would observe the strictest neutrality."'^
England seemed not to be aware of what was happening across the
channel. Lord Auckland, the British Ambassador at The Hague,
Barked this with regret as he wrote on Karch 4, 1792, "This
indifference as to foreign affairs is general through the king-
dom; you may find it even in our newspapers; perhaps it may be
Justly attributed to the great prosperity of the country, which
confines all attention to interior and insular details."'^
The overthrow of the French monarchy and the execution of
Louis XVI on January 21, 1793, did not alter the British neu-
tralist policy. It is true that England decided to recall Earl
Oower, her Ambassador at Paris, an act to which France protested.
But Grenville informed the revolutionary government that this
action on the part or England was only a matter of course since
the ambassador had been presented to Louis XVI. Grenville
'Browning, 0£. cit . . p. 296.
73Diaries and Correspondence of James Harris, First Earl of
Malmesbury, II, (London: Richard Bentley, Idiflf), p. 4Sd.
74Auckland, a£. £ii., II, pp. 398-399.
empbaeizeci the point that this rscall would not change the
British neutral policy. Lebrun, the French Minister for Foreign
Affairs, welcomed Grenville's announcement and regarded it as a
sign of friendly relations between the two countries. Chauvelin,
the French Ambassador at London, was informed that he no longer
would be officially recognized, but he would be received un-
officially. 75
As late as November 6, 1792, Oronville wrote that he had
throughout disapproved of the Austro-Prussian invasion of France,
as it tended to strengthen the Jacobin power in France and to
delay the re-establishment of order. Although he feared the
spread of republicanism to England, he believed that a policy of
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neutrality would help to minimize this danger.
When the Emperor sent a circular to the different European
powers calling for advice and assistance to protect the French
King, the British answer was expressed in a letter written by
Orenville to Lord Auckland on September 18, 1792:
....that our neutral conduct gives us no claims
to interfere either with advice or opinions unless
solicited, and that our general wishes, on the one hand,
are that France never again resume the same restless and
troublesome system which has so often been fatal to the
peace of nations; and on the other, that an executive
government may exist there so as to restrain the present
lawless and atrocious spirit. '7
75john 'lolland Rose, "The Struggle with Revolutionary
France," tjia Cambridge History fif British Foreign Policy 1783-
1919 . I, ITlii;. Ward and G. P. Gooch, ed., (New York: The Mac-
Killan Co., 1922), pp. 216-217. Hereafter cited as Rose, The
Struggle*
'Auckland, sfi- £ii«i PP« 264-266.
77lbid.. pp. U3-U4.
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The foregoing quotation shows the announced feelings of the
British government towards the situation. As far as internal
troubles were concerned, England had no desire to interfere,
wishing that the revolutionary leaders would stick to their word
in denouncing expanslonlstlc war and stating that the Revolution
had no territorial afflbitions. But, if the revolutionary leaders
would show a reverse attitude, then England would become con-
cerned and would have to revise her neutralist policy.
When the French armies occupied Brussels in November, 1792,
Britain started to worry about Holland, whom England was required
to defend by the Treaty of 17^^. This led England to make a dec-
laration assuring the Dutch government that she would not hesi-
tate in assisting her In all ways if circumstances would require,
against any attempt on the part of any power to Invade her do-
minions or to disturb her government. This declaration was meant
to be a warning not only to the French but also to the Dutch
7d
republican "patriots" whose activities were increasing.
The attitude of King George III regarding the Revolution in
this period was well expressed in a letter written by him to
Pitti
Indeed my natural sentiments are so strong for
peace that no event of less moment than the present
could have made me decidedly of opinion that duty, as
well as Interest, calls on us to join against that most
savage as well as unprincipled nation.'^
This Idtter was written on February 2, 1793, after Louis XVI
^^Rose, Piil, 2E. £lt., p. n.
''John Heneage Jesse, Memoirs of the Life and Reign of King
George the Thiroj . Ill, (London: Tinsley Brothers, 1867), p. 201.
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had been executed. This shows that all his anger and hatred
toward the Revolution was a result of his sorrow at the fate of
his fellow King. It also clearly shows the vigorous hostility
of George III toward the Revolution.
In a letter dated November 13, 1792, Pitt wrote to the
Marquis of Stafford expressing his fears about the state of
affairs in France, but he had not yet lost his hope in presei^ing
peace between the two countries.
The strange and unfortunate events which have fol-
lowed one another so rapidly on the continent, are in
many views matter of serious and anxious consideration.
That which presses the most relates to the situation
of Holland. .. .and as must indeed be the case in conse-
quence of the events in f'landers. However unfortunate
it would be to find this country in any shape committed,
it seems absolutely impossible to hesitate as to sup-
porting our ally in case of necessity, and the explicit
declaration of our sentiments is the most likely way to
prevent the case occurring....
Perhaps some opinion may arise which may enable us
to contribute to the termination of the war. .. .leaving
France (which I believe is the best way) to arrange its
own internal affairs as it can."*^
The fears of the British government regarding the future
foreign policy of revolutionary Franc* were soon to materialize.
The successes of the French armies raised to the highest pitch
the arrogance of the Convention. On November 17, 1792, it issued
the famous decree in which, in the name of the French people, it
offered fraternity and assistance to any nation that desired to
80
Leveson Vernon Harcourt, ed., The Diaries and Corres-
pondence of the Right Hon . George Rqse . I, (London: Richard
Bentley, 1360), pp. 114-115. Hereafter cited as Rose . Diaries .
51
gain liberty from tyrants. In other words, they offered to
interfere in the internal affairs of other nations against
royalty. Another decree followed on November 27 proposing the
incorporation of Savoy into France. This proposal was executed.
This means that they annexed a foreign territory gained by mili-
tary force, an act that was contrary to their previous denuncia-
tion of expanaionistic ambitions. Furthermore, a decree was
issued on February 16, 1792, declaring freedom of navigation on
both the Scheldt and Mouse Rivers. At this point the British
could no longer maintain their neutral policy. Because of these
three decrees, the British government felt that the Revolution
was not only dangerous to France, but also to the other states,
and more important that its policies were in direct conflict
with British interests and security. ^^
On December 9, 1792, Pitt wrote that the gross disregard of
treaties shown lately by Franc* and her encouragement to the
revolutionary spirit in all lands compelled the government to
add to its armed forces. Pitt added that the present situation
required firmness and decision, both at home and abroad. Both
Pitt and Granville became equally convinced of the need for firm-
ness in resisting the French decrees, partly because of their
aggressive and illegal nature, but also because surrender would
influence the spirits of the British malcontents. ^2 Thus, rup-
ture between England and France became inevitable, and it remained
^^Stanhope, ££. siS^-t H. P' 173.
92
to be seen only who would declare war first. When in December,
1792, French warships forced their way to the sea, the Stadt-
holder concluded that invasion would follow and he called for
British help. England, at once, answered with readiness to give
it and ordered all shipments of grain and raw materials from
Sngland to France to be halted. On January U, 1793 > Chauvelin
was given his passport in order to leave the country. On Feb-
ruary 1, 1793. France declared war against both England and
Holland. Some of the reasons given in the French declaration
were that England had violated the Treaty of 1786 by refusing
to trade with France, that both the King of England and the
Stadtholder were conspiring with France's enemies by giving
refuge to the emigres , and that England was giving subsidies to
France's enemies, Austria and Prussia. It condemned England for
refusing to recognize the Republic and by preparing for war by
Introducing a land and sea arofunent program. Therefore,
The National Conv?ntion declares, in the name of
the French nation, that in consideration of all the
aforementioned acts of hostility and aggression, the
French Republic is at war with the King of England and
the Stadtholder of the United Provinces. 83
'
'
'*
'^^'' •"?i^^ '
Coalition on Trial
England entered the War of 1793 with certain aims to be
achieved. It is needless to repeat here the traditional British
d3
"^John Hall Stewart, A Documentary Survey of the French
Revolution . (New lork: The~MacMillan Company, 195lTpp. 399-401.
Hereafter cited as Documentary Survey .
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policy and feeling of insecurity in regard to Holland whenever
Holland was threatened by any of the large powers. Another
tradition in British foreign policy was the maintenance of a
balance of power in Europe and Intervention if any power showed
signs of interest and strength desiring to dominate the con-
tinent. France, by beating Austria and Prussia and by occupying
Flanders and opening the Scheldt, had threatened both lines of
the British policy. If England did not have any serious terri-
torial ambitions on the continent, she, nevertheless, looked
forward to reducing the strength of her ancient rival. England's
territorial ambitions lay in outstripping France of her overseas
possessions. This aim could explain why Britain was sending
large expeditions to the West Indies to conquer the French col-
onies, wnile the Coalition forces ware fighting battles in the
continent. This also would be one reason for dissolving the
Coalition and defeating its forces.
Concerning this connection, Lord Malmesbury wrote in his
Diaries on January 20, 1793, that Pitt told him that war was
inevitable, that England was better prepared th-^n France, that
Russia and Spain were ready to Join the Coalition, and that
England woulc obtain the French overseas colonies. ^
Another aim was to prevent the Revolutionary ideas from
spreading over Europe, including England, where the Republican
societies had already shown themselves dangerous to the ruling
class. Thus, by defeating France, those societies and their
**IUl«e8bury, sjb. £ii., II, pp. 501-502.
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activities would be wiped out. Relative to this point, Grenville
wrote to Auckland on November 13, 1792:
The increased activities and boldness of our Re-
publicans since the Duke of Brunswick's retreat is
certainly very striking, and still more of the same sort
must be apprehended from the conquest of Flanders."?
Pitt, however, had no real intention of imposing upon the
French people a certain type of government, as was the case with
other members of the Coalition. At the time Britain joined the
Coalition she insisted that the allies should drop their demands
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for kingship restoration.
On the same day that the English government dispatched the
declaration to Holland, they sent instructions to the British
Ambassadors at Berlin and Vienna directing them to break the
long silence on French affairs awd to start preliminary contacts
in this regard with the two Courts. These instructions, as Pitt
had written, were necessarily in very general terms,
....as in the ignorance of the designs of Austria
and Prussia and in the uncertainty as to what events
every day may produce, It seems impossible to decide
definitely at the present on the line which we ought
to pursue except as relates to Holland. 87
On February 5, 1793, after the war had been declared against
England, a dispatch was received by Eden Instructing him to
pursue the establishment of a close connection between England
"^Historical Manuscripts Commission, Report on the Manu-
8(;ript3 af i.B. Fortescue . Ega-i Preserved ai iiropmore. II,
(London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1894), p. 332. Here-
after cited as Dfopmore .
^^Laprade, 2£. clt .. p. 125.
37Hose, Diaries . a£.- £!£., p. 115.
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and both Prussia and Austria, in order to cooperate on the
affairs of France and in order that no jealousy or concealment
should exist between the said Courts. "The King," said Grenville
in his instructions to Eden, "desires to enter into a formal en-
gagement with the Emperor and the King of Prussia on the prin-
eiples which have been always opened to both these two powers."
These principles include the abandonment by France of all her
conquests and the renxmciation of all views of interference in
the interior of other countries and of all measures of aggres-
sion or hostility against them. England would at once send her
troops to the continent to continue the war in conjunction with
the other two powers. The three powers were not to make peace
with France except by mutual consent of all of them and in
agreement with the above-mentioned principles. Regarding Poland,
Xngland regretfully would not agree to any plan aiming at its
partition, but, nevertheless, England had no interest in opposing
go
the execution of such a plan.
Similar overtures were made by England to Russia. As early
as December 29, 1792, Pitt proposed to Catherine II that a joint
representation should be made to France, assuring her that if
she would abandon her conquests, rescind the acts which were
injurious to rther nations, and give a pledge that she would not
in the future disturb her neighbors, they would interfere on her
behalf in order that all acts of hostility against her should
Morton Eden, British Ambassador to Berlin and later on to
Vienna and brother of Lord Auckland.
^^Lecky, o£. cit.. VII, p. 164-166.
cease and that no foreign power would be allowed to interfere
with her government or constitution. The French declaration of
war against England interrupted these negotiations, and it was
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not until 1800 that the intended representation was disclosed.
At the time of the war declaration against England, all British
diplomats were extraordinarily active on the continent. Lord
St. Helen, the Ambassador to Madrid, met encouraging response to
his efforts. The Spaniards were, on March 26, 1793, anxious to
unite their fleet with that of Britain in order to counteract any
hostile noveaent on the part of the French navy. The Spanish
expressed their readiness to join the campaign against France.'
In the early days of April, 1793i the nations that were
already engaged in war against France sent representatives to a
conference at Antwerp. These nations, constituting the Coalition
in its new shape, were England, Prussia, Austria, Sardinia, and
Naples. Soon Spain and Portugal Joined the concert. ^^
In this conference it was agreed that it was going to be a
war of conquest and plunder as well as self-defense. The avowed
object was to impose on the French people a form of government
based on principles repudiated by them but acceptable to the
allies.'^ Lord Auckland, England's representative, announced
9°Ibld., p. 166.
9lL)ropaore . op . cit .. II, p. 386.
92john Holland Rose, "The Conflict With Revolutionary France
1793-1302," rM Cambridge History of ihg British Empire . J. H.
Rose, et al., ed., (Cambridge: The University Press, 1940) p. 41.
Hereafter cited as Rose, The Conflict .
93Robertson, {je- cit .. p. 371.
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that his country was in favor of retaining conquests that might
be made. As for her share, he mentioned Dunkirk and the French
possessions in the East and West Indies. The fate of Belgium,
Alsace and Lorraine was discussed. ^^ England, however, did not
agree to the Austrian plan of exchanging the Austrian Nether-
lands for Bavaria. England tried to convince Austria not to
keep the Netherlands by promising her territorial gains in
Flanders at France's expense. England wanted to have in this
area bounding France a strong power instead of a weak and de-
pendent one which would be easy for France to overcome. England's
aim was to diminish France's power. 95 The Austrlans, although
they were still convinced of the idea of the exchange, did not
insist on their view and gave Lord Auckland the impression that
if Britain would strongly oppose their scheme, they would give
way and accept the British point of view. 96 Austria, however,
became more Interested in Flanders later on when the second
partition of Poland took place In which Russia and Prussia got
the best part of the prize and Austria was left empty handed.
Hence, Austria's ambitions later became centered in the Low
97Countries to compensate for what she had missed in the East."
Catherine of Russia concluded a treaty of commerce with England,
and in a second treaty she promised her cooperation in block-
ading the commerce of France. Catherine agreed to help in
9*Auckland, qd. cit .. Ill, pp. 4-5.
95ibi^., pp. 21-22.
^iWatson, ££. aii., p. 364.
''Hunt, ££• sis.-, P' 349.
preventing neutral ships from supplying France with provisions.
Consequently, the British navy was ordered to stop all ships
•ngaged in trad* with France and to send them to England where
their cargoes would be sold and their freights paid by the
govem.ent.98
The King of Sardinia was granted a subsidy of 200,000 pounds
to enable him to keep up his army. England, also, concluded a
treaty with the King of the Two Sicilies, agreeing that her fleet
would join the allied fleets in the Mediterranean. Jointly this
fleet was a formidable one, A similar treaty was concluded with
Portugal, England's ancient ally. Spain joined the Coalition in
May, 1793, when France first declared war against her. Thus, it
looked as if all of the European states had joined their efforts
to form a formidable force in order to crush the French Revolu-
tion. No wonder, then, that England felt certain that the fruits
of the expected easy victory would soon fall with abundance into
her lap. Out of the Coalition in Europe there remained as neu-
trals the Scandinavian countries, Switzerland, Tuscany, Venice,
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Genoa, and Turkey.
It is not tlM purpose of this work to dwell with military
history, but a brief summary of the military operations might
help in understanding the diplomatic developments of the time.
England sent an army to Flanders under the command of the Duke
IhhM-, p. 349.
'^Alphonse De Lamartine, Hlstorv of the Girondists , III,
(Mm York: Harper t Brothers, Publishers, 1874)
,
p. 197.
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of Tork, the son of Qeorg* III. Other troops from Hanover and
Hessen Joined the army. This army was supposed to act In con-
Junction with the Austrian army under the command of the Prince
of Coburg. The Prussians acted Independently on the Rhine. From
February to August, 1793, the French received a series of de-
feats. Uemourles lost the decisive battle of Meerwinden, and he
deserted to the oaeny. As a result, Belgium fell into the hands
of Austria again. The French fortified towns of Mayence and
Valenciennes surrendered. Toulon was captured by the British
with the assistance of the Spaniards and Nepolitanians. These
defeats did not, ae the allies expected, reduce the French to
helplessness or break down their spirits. On the contrary, it
inspired them with new spirits of heroism and patriotism. They
became a nation in arms. The tide turned to their side. Toulon
was recaptured and on its scene the genius of the young officer
Napoleon showed itself. The Duke of Tork, who was besieging
Dunkirk, was driven back with the loss of all his heavy artil-
lery. Austria was defeated at \/>attignies. The Austrlans,
furthermore, received severe bloMS In the battles of Worth and
Welssenburg. Brunswick did not risk a decisive battle with the
French, nor did he give any assistance to the Austrlans. Prussia
now had come to the point where she had no real Interest in this
war against France. Her eyes were fixed now on the better and
100
less costly territorial prise lying ripe for her in Poland.
Rosebury, 2£. £ll.i P» 130.
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In the year 1794, the French dealt a decisive blow to the
Austrians in the battle of Fleurs, which ended the campaign of
Flanders with France victorious. As a result the defense for
Holland was hopeless and, consequently, on November 18, 1793,
the British were obliged to withdraw their soldiers from all the
Low Countries, which again fell into the hands of the French. In
the south the French drove out the Spaniards and Portuguese and
advanced to the northern provinces of Spain.
England was able, however, on the sea surfaces and in over-
seas territories, to make some compensation for her losses on
the continent. England captxired the French settlements in India
and some of her West Indies Islands. These ccxiquests, partic-
ularly in the West Indies, were very costly to Great Britain and
fell short of her plans due to wild French resistance, coupled
with disease and Negro determination to fight for the freedoms
that they were promised by the French Revolution. Moreover, the
British expeditions sent to these areas were, in some cases, taken
102from the British army in Flanders. This not only weakened the
British contributions to the vigorous campaign there but also
brought her complaints from her allies, who accused her of fail-
ing them for the purpose of securing selfish colonial gains.
Some prominent British diplomats also had criticized this atti-
tude of Great Britain. Lord Auckland wrote the following letter
to Qrenville, dated November 7, 1793:
^^•^Watson, 2£- £ii-. P« 370.
102Auckland, ^. £1^,., Ill, pp. 137-138.
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Our first object to b« Is to destroy the Conven-
tion; and it appears to me this if we are materially
diverted fron that object by the pursuit of conquests,
whether on the continent of Europe or in the East or
West Indies, we risk the fate of the whole war and of the
existing race of mankind. May it be added that we do
this in pursuit of acquisitions which we might have with-
out effort or expense t For it is in Kurope only that the
success of the allies armies and the commanding superi-
ority of our naval force can enable us to compel the
French nation to such conditions and sacrifice as may be
thought necessary for our future safety and tranquility. '"^
On the sea the fortunes of Britain were better than on land.
In the early years of the war the British had the support of
numerous allies, since the Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, and the
Mepolitanian navies were all acting in concert with that of
Britain. These allies outnumbered the French in seapower by
three to one. They, however, lacked unity of aim and command,
and this reduced their ability and efficiency. '^ While the
year 1794 saw the hopes of England vanish on the continent, she
had, however, achieved notable success on the sea. Hood at-
tacked Corsica and was successful in capturing it, although the
importance of this action is doubtful. The victory of June 1,
1793( was the first naval achievement for the British. Admiral
Howe won a great victory in the Atlantic over the French main
fleet of Brest. ^'^^
By 1794 Pitt had decided that this war wculd not be as
•hort as he had thought before. Pitt wrongly felt, therefore.
^°3h. W. Wilson, "The Naval War," The Cambridge Modem
History . VIII, Lord Acton, et al., od., (Cambridge: The Univer-
sity Press, 1934), p. 456. Hereafter cited as Wilson, Kaval War .
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that since It would be a long one, the best way for England to
win it was by economic warfare. He thought that by outstripping
the French overseas possessions and by the British navy block-
ading the French trade, France would be beggered and broken.
This idea certainly was incorrect, and it indicates a complete
Ignorance of France's richness in nat\u*al resources and of what
revolutionary finance and organization could produce.^
It is obvious now that the efforts of the First Coalition
to impose its will and ambitions on France had met complete
failure. It may be asked, then, that how, with France thus
distracted and divided, the Coalition against her could fail.
But the Coalition, in fact, was by no means as powerful or
formidable as it seemed at first sight. Russia stood in an
ambiguous state between peace and war, but contributing nothing
to the military campaign. Spain and Sardinia caused only neg-
ligible trouble to the French in the southern frontiers. Prussia
appeared to be fully satisfied with the siege of some towns on
the Rhine and absolutely not agreeable to any aggressive opera-
tions. The Dutch looked only for the protection of their own
territory. Thus the burden of the war fell mainly on Austria
and England, the latter, furthermore, dividing her operation in
different areas. Worse still was the way in which the military
operations were carried out, for instead of uniting their armies
into one mighty force to march directly to Paris, their armies
^°^Hunt, ss- £ii-i pp. 351-354.
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were divided in conunand and operation. Each army was occupied
in conquering the territory which, by the Antwerp Conference or
by their own designs, had been assigned to their respective
countries. To make matters still worse, the fighting continued
in different areas: in Flanders, the Rhine, France's southern
frontiers, and in overseas territories.
The military deficiencies and faults of the Coalition were
basically due to differences between the allies on the alms and
objects of the campaign. Jingland was concerned about Flanders
for her security, while Austria was not interested in keeping
it. Thus England tried to encourage Austria by promising her
Alsace and Lorraine, which were to be conquered with the help of
Prussia. Prussia, however, would not help to conquer territory
for Austria, nor to assist in the dismemberment of France, un-
less the hmperor would consent to the treaty of partitioning
Poland which was secretly arranged between Frederick William and
Catherine II on January 23, 1793. Thugut, the Austrian Chan-
cellor, who was violently hostile to Prussia, would not consent
to such a treaty; for the result would be to strengthen Prussia,
and furthermore, Austria would not share in the spoils. The
Prussian King thought the Austrian refusal to accept the parti-
tion had encouraged the Poles to resist his demands. Hence, he
left his army on the Rhine and went to the Polish border, order-
ing the iJuke of Brunswick not to engage In any operation that
might prevent him from sending to Poland such troops as the
altuatlon there might demand. ^'
This Jealousy and distrust was not limited to Prussia and
Austria but was also to be found in the case of Spain and
Holland, who, as maritime powers, were convinced that England
was planning to gain all the fruits of victory for herself.
The British overseas conquests were not regarded with easiness
by those two countries. Spain in particiaar feared that the
British operations in the West Indies, where she had vital
Interests, would endanger those interests.
Thus it is only natural, with such division, distrust.
Jealousy, and difference in objectives, that the Coalition ex-
perienced military disasters in the years 1793-94. But this is
not all. The Coalition had still to see its own collapse, which
started in 1795 and ended in 1798.
In summing up the main points of this chapter, the following
could be said: The occurrence of the French Revolution and its
developments did not only arouse the Courts of Europe but also
led to their military interventions. This idea of intervention
was led by tha two Germanic powers—Prussia and Austria—who by
the Pllnitz Declaration of August, 1791, declared their Intention
to intervene if the French royal family was endangered. On
April 20, 1792, war started between France on the one hand and
First Coalition country members on the other. The French were
able to halt the advance of the allied armies and then to drive
them out of France. The French followed their victory by
'Laprade, 2£. ci^., p. 432.
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occupying Belgium, Nice, and Savoy.
FroB the beginning of the Revolution up to November, 1792,
England had assumed an attitude of strict neutrality In regard to
the Revolution. But when the French defeated the First Coalition
armies and annexed Belgiun, Nice, and Savoy, England not only
felt her security threatened but also felt that the balance of
power had been brolcen and that France might dominate £urope.
Hence, England Joined the First Coalition. Although the allied
armies were able to achieve some victories over the French in
1793, the French were soon able to repulse them and finally to
scatter their armies in the continent. Prussia signed the Peace
of Basle with France in 1795, and the other Coalition country
members followed suit. By 1798 the First Coalition was dissolved,
and England found herself alone in the field against the vic-
torious French.
OVERTURES AND TREATIES
Forced Peace
The military failures of the Allies in the campaign of 1793
emphasized the need for securing substantial help from Prussia
during the year of 1794 • Prussia, however, seemed resolved to
continue narking tine on the Rhine, while acting energetically
in Poland. Pitt, therefore, advised the dispatch of Lord
Halmesbury in a special mission to Berlin to clear matters up<
Grenville, convinced of the falseness of the Prussian Alliance,
advised against any subsidy to her. When Malmesbiiry met with
Frederick William, the latter assured Malmesbury of his fidelity
to the Treaty of 1788. The King, however, described the finances
of his country as exhausted and said that unless he received a
subsidy from England, he would be obliged to recall his army on
the Rhine. If this subsidy were granted, he promised to increase
his army on the Rhine to 100,000 men. Grenville suspected Prus-
sia's real intentions but he, nevertheless, agreed to the sug-
gested subsidy. ^^° But nothing was to induce Prussia to act
seriously on the Rhine. By Jtuie, 1794, even Malmesbury, who
previously recommended the subsidy to Prussia, had reached the
conclusion that England could not expect any more Prussian
nilitary aid. Nevertheless, both he and Pitt clung to the re-
mote hope of honesty in the Prussian government and successfully
opposed Grenville' s proposition of an immediate withdrawal of
l°%08e, T^ SiEHgaljs, ££. sH,., pp. 243-245-
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subsidies if Prussian troops would not at once begin their
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march to the Rhine. '
On February 3, 1795, Malmesbury wrote to Orenvllle that
Prussia was vexed at the excessive demands of the French and was
about to renew war. A few days after this letter was received
in London, Pitt brought forward his plan for a subsidy to Prussia
to infuse energy into the war and to keep Prussia from making
peace with France. Grenvllle's opposition was this time instant
and determined. He informed Pitt that in case the plan was in-
sisted upon, he then would resign his office. Pitt was upset at
the thought of a rupture with Grenville, though he was aware
that Grenvllle's inclination to an Austrian alliance and his
distrust of Prussia would cause him to oppose the project. '^^"
In the last week of February Pitt wrote to Grenville:
I have been trying to put together what, according
to my idea, should be the instruction on this unfor-
tunate subject of Prussia, and have desired a cabinet to
be fixed for twelve tomorrow The more I think on the
business the more uneasiness I feel at what you seemed
likely to determine, and I want much to talk it over with
you at large. Ill
Grenvllle's objections to a Prussian subsidy were drawn up
in a memorial in which he reviewed former conclusive reasons
against an English offer of subsidy. He accused the King of
Prussia of being either unsteady in his own principles or much
under the guidance of unprincipled men. Grenville further
l°9£phralBi Douglass Adams, Ihe Influence of Grenville sa
Pitt's Foreign Policy 1787-1798, (Washington. D.C.: The Carnegie
Institution of Washington, 1904), p. 27.
llOl^id., p. 32.
lllPropmore . ££. ^i^.. Ill, p. 25.
Maccused him of the following: that the French party In Berlin's
Court was dominating, and that that party favoring the war was
grossly weakened; that the King was negotiating with France
while asking subsidy from England; that the King believed that
regardless of his interest in Holland, although profound and
real, she would fall under the influence of France rather than
that of £jigland. Concerning Russia, whom Prussia feared, it was
thought by the Prussian King that she should have France as a
friend in order to be able to face the Hussian expansionistic
ambitions. Urenville further thought that Prussia had no inter-
est in recovering the Netherlands to be given to her traditional
enemy, Austria. Qrenvllle believed that England's negotiations
with Prussia at the present time would alienate Austria and
Russia, with whom it should be England's policy to endeavor to
form the closest union. Such desired union could not happen, in
Grenville's opinion, as long as England would continue trying to
resume her former close connections with Berlin. ^^^ Grenville
suspected that Prussia might use the British subsidy offer merely
to get better terms from France. He also felt that Pitt's
government would be discredited at home in case her efforts in
Berlin would fail to bring the desired results.
Grenville concluded his memorial with the following:
Of these objections the greater part apply with at
least equal force to the opening of such a negotiation
as to the conclusion of the treaty. The overture cannot
be concealed from the knowledge of Austria and Russia.
^
"jjbid.. Ill, pp. 26-29.
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The King of Prussia has in all cases an interest in
making it icnown to Paris, and if disclosed there it
cannot be expected to remain a secret here. Vvhatever
impression, therefore, is to be feared from the effect
of the treaty upon the conduct of the Courts of Peters-
burg or Vienna will equally be produced by a knowleage
of the offer. The objection respecting the facilitating
a peace between Prussia and France supposes the failure
of the negotiation. And the difficulty here would (if
not equally great) be very considerable, if we had to
defend the making to the King of Prussia an humiliating
and fruitless offer of fresh pecuniary assistance,
after having broken off the treaty last year on the
'
''
• ground of his ill faith. 113
As early as 179/* Frederick William started his direct over-
tures to France, but by December he bad decided to reach a con-
clusion in his relations with France. On December 1, 1794, he
sent Count Von der Goltz to Switzerland to open negotiations
with any French representative. Golts's inatructions were that
Prussia coveted the role of a pacificator of Kurope and would
be glad to negotiate peace, not only between her and France, but
for all the other belligerent countries; that Prussia could not
make a definitive peace with France, onich less an alliance, but
desired an armistice and desired the benefits of neutrality
until general European peace could be concluded. The King of
Prussia preferred not to recognize the Republic but would do so
if France would evacuate all Prussian territory.^^'* The French
Comittee of Public Safety respondea to these views of Prussia
by offering her an Immediate alliance against Russia and Austria
and this to be reinforced by the adherence of Sweden, Denmark,
JJflMd., Ill, p. 30.
'•'^Syciny Seymour Biro,
France . X, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 314.
'^Syd The German Policy of Revolutionary
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Turkey, and Poland. The French meantime rejected the sugges-
tions for Prussian mediation for general peace. Prussia, on the
other hand, rejected the idea of alliance and, hence, France
refused to grant her an armistice. The French then announced
their conditions for peace: France would like to annex all
territoiry on the left bank of the Rhine; Prussia meantime could
be compensated for territorial losses on the left bank by other
provinces on the right bank at the expense of Austria or the
ecclesiastical bishoperies.
The Franco-Prussian negotiations took place in Basle.
Barthilemy, the French minister to Switzerland, represented
France, and Hardenburg, who took the place of Golta, represented
Prussia. Prussia now accepted the idea of separate peace. She
insisted upon her wish of neutrality, not only for herself, but
also for all of northern Germany, for which Prussia was assuming
leadership. France finally agreed upon this point and gave
Prussia the choice of any territory in Germany to compensate for
her lost territory on the left bank of the Rhine.
Finally on April 5, 1795, all points of conflict were
•ettled and the Treaty of Basle was signed by the two parties.
In this Treaty the contracting parties agreed that peace
should prevail over their relations and all hostile activities
should cease immediately. The French troops should evacuate the
Prussian provinces which they were occupying on the right bank of
"^ibld., I, pp. 315-316.
"°ii:iii'i 1. PP' 343-3U.
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the Rhine, b\it they would continue to occupy Prussian territories
on the left bank. France would welcome the gpoi offices of the
King of Prussia on behalf of the Princes and States of the Holy
Soman Empire who would desire to enter directly into negotiations
with France. ^^"^
In separate and secret articles the two contracting powers
agreed that the King of Prussia should not undertake any hostile
enterprises against Holland or other territories occupied by
French troops. If at the general pacification between France and
the States of the Holy Roman Empire, the left bank of the Rhine
would remain with France, then the parties should come to terms
about the cession of those Prussian provinces occi^ied by the
lisFrench troops and how Prussia would be compensated.
Prussia's decision to make peace with France was no doubt
hastened by the Polish situation. On January 3« 1795, Russia
and Austria had secretly come to agreement for a final partition
of Poland, in which those two powers were to gain much more im-
portant accessions than what Prussia had had in the last parti-
tion. News of this agreement reached Berlin. The Prussian
govemmeiit, hence, hoped that by concluding an Immediate peace
with France, she would become free to act In the East in order
to get an equal share of the spoils of the planned Third Partl-
tlon.119
•''^Stewart, Documentary Survey, ££. clt .. pp. 563-565«
H^iiid-. PP- 565-567.
llVflrinton, jje. s^., p. 207.
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While Prussia was negotiating with France, the former did
not atop her diplomatic discussion with England for the purpose
of improving their lagging relations. Prussia was continuously
assuring England that she would re-enter the war if she would
receive a sizeable subsidy from England. When the negotiations
at Basle became known to Malmesbury, he at first considered it
as mere intrigue to bring pressure to bear on France, ^^^ but on
March 24, 1795, he became sure that Prussia had decided to reach
a positive conclusion to those negotiations. ^^•'^ When Malmesbury
brought this news with him to London on April Ath, Pitt at once
resiimed with enthusiasm his scheme of a subsidy to Pznissia.
Instructions were drawn and sent to Lord Spencer, the now Ajb-
bassador at Berlin, to open at once negotiations with the King
of Prussia. ^^2 on April 10th, Malmesbury wrote to Hardenburg
at Basle notifying him of the new steps taken by England and
urging him to delay signing a treaty with France until he had
heard from Berlin. •'•^' But Pitt was too late. The peace of Basle
had been signed on April 5th, and as soon as this news reached
London, all hopes of Prussian aid dropped away, and the plan for
subsidy was stopped by Pitt.
The Peace of Basle was only the start of a series of dis-
asters dealt to the British diplomacy. After concluding the
Peace of Basle, the Committee of Public Safety dispatched two of
120Aciams, a£,. iii., p. 33.
•''''•Malmesbury, q^. £!£. , III, p. 250.
^22Adam8, q^. £ii., pp. 33-34.
^^^Malmesbury, aS" cit .. Ill, p. 254.
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Its aembers, Reubcll and Sliyes, to The Hague in order to ne-
gotiate a treaty with Holland.^^
The Treaty of The Hague, signed on May 16, 1795, settled the
relations between the conqueror Franca and the conquered Holland.
The freedom of navigation in the Scheldt and the other rivers was
affirmed by this treaty. France rocognlsed the United Provinces
as an independent republic, while the Stadtholderate was de>
nounced. The Dutch were to pay a war indemnity of 100,000,000
florins to the bankrupt French. The most important part of the
treaty was its articles binding the two countries in an offensive-
defeneive alliance against the enemies of either country. The
Dutch forces on land and aea were to be under the French eoaaand.
The French troops were to continue occupying the country during
the present war. Holland was to cede to France I>utch Flanders,
Maestricht, and Venloo.^''
In secret articles Holland agreed to hand to France on un-
conditioned loan, three ships of the line and four frigates.^^^
England was singularly awarded in two articles:
i». Said offensive and defensive alliance shall
always apply against tjigland, in all cases in which
either of the two Republics is at war with her.
5. The Fiench Republic may not make peace with
England, or negotiate with her without concurrence and
consent of the other. ^27
^^*Leo Oershoy, The French Hevolutlon apJ Napoleon . (New
Xork: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1933), p. 303. Hereafter
cited as Gershoy,
,2l8 French Revolution .
125stewart, Oocumentarv Survey
. 2£. iil., pp. 567-570.
tl^msk'. p. 570.
'jSid'. P« 568.
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Thus iitegland's long-time ally, Holland, had deserted her
and aided with her enemjr. As a result she lost to Great Britain
oat of her West Indian colonies and, in addition, two of her
ost important ones, the Cape of Good Hope and Ceylon.
In still another area a secret convention in March, 1795,
ended the hostilities between France and Tuscany, who was the
first menber of the Coalition to desert it by making peace with
France. Spain was the second large power, after Prussia, to seek
peace with France, a peace concluded in Basle on July 22, 1795.
The Spanish monarch recognized the French Republic, thus aban-
doning the cause of the Bourbons. Spain was to cede the Spanish
part of Santo Domingo island, which became entirely French. In
return France abandoned her recent conquests in Spanish terri-
tory. By the end of the year 1795, Saxony, Hanover, and Hesse-
Cassel were also detached fron the Coalition either by French
armies or French diplomacy.^^
Catherine II was the master in the East as a result of
partitioning of Poland because of fierce Jealousies between
Prussia and Austria, whereby they had become subordinated to
Catherine. She virtually dictated the terms of the Third Parti-
tion, which was not completed until October, 1795. Great Britain,
of course, was helpless to prevent these arrangements in the
East. Thus, in the winter of 1794-95, as two years before, the
123Gershoy, The French Revolution , op. cit., p. 303«
'Brinton, o^. iit., p. 208.
75
cramble for Polish lands distracted the policy of Berlin and
Vienna, nullifying all the efforts of Great Britain to construct
a solid barrier against France's aggressions in the West. When
these efforts appeared to be fruitless, Pitt and Crenvllle
turned to Russia and concluded a defensive alliance, which was
signed at Petersburg on February 13, 1795, for granting mutual
armed assistance in case either power was attacked. In such a
case, Russia would furnish 12,000 troops and England twelve
sails of the line. ^30
In the latter months of 1794, when Prussia seemed to be
withdrawing from the war and Orenville was convinced that no aid
could be expected from Prussia, he was able to bring the English
cabinet to accept a project for an Austrian alliance. He thought
that this would be compensation for H.ngland's position due to the
betraral of Prussia. In the latter part of July, 1794, Spencer,
British Ambassador to Berlin, and Thomas Grenville^^^ were dis-
patched to Vienna. But the negotiation dragged on without
Austria being as yet able to agree upon terms of a treaty with
England. Lord Crenvllle had expected to find willingness at the
Court of Vienna to accept the British policy regarding the con-
duct of the war, provided only that a liberal subsidy and a
guarantee of the possible conquests be granted. Instead the
two British diplomats found a suspicious Court and a changeable
^3°Rose, The Struggle, ££. ili., p. 252.
^^^He is the brother of Lord Crenvllle, the British Minis-
ter for Foreign Affairs.
policy. Austria was anxious to exchange the Netherlands for
Bavaria and indirectly sounded the English ministry on this
point but did not venture to propose it openly. These differ-
ences in policy, accompanied with other complications, made the
British ministry withdraw her two diplomat s.^-'^ Thomas Grenville
suoBwd up the attitude of Austria during his mission in a letter
to Lord Grenville on August 12, 1794. He noted that there were
secret negotiations between Austria and France for the purpose
of Austria abandoning the war, and that Austria's internal and
financial probleas were great. Gnmity between Austria and
Prussia caused the fear that Prussia might Join France by alli-
ance. Austria believed that Russia should put pressure on
Prussia in order to keep her from going to extremes. He ended
his letter by saying, "They (the Austrians) will, I fear, play
with us by giving orders to move when they get money only, and
they will probably get none till the places are lost which they
ought to recover. "^33
Lord Cornwallis^34 wrote on July 26, 1794, about the Aus-
trian attitude at the time of the Grenville-Spencer mission, that
Thugut's plans were not to move the Austrian troops unless
England either pay an actual subsidy or guarantee a large loan
^^^Adams, SM- SH.- , PP. 27-28.|->J Dropmore . 0£. cit., II, pp. 614-615.
•'^Lord Cornwallis had been commander of British armies
during the American Revolution; then he was sent to India as
Governor General. In 1794 he was sent by the British government
to the continent to study the military situation in the proposi-
tion that he would hold the command of the Joint allied armies.
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of at least 3,000,000 pounds. Thugut believed that maintaining
the Netherlands was not as adyantageous to Austria as it was to
England. ^35 Spencer, in a letter to Lord Comwallis, said that
the i!4uperor had decided not to defend the Netherlands or to keep
a big army in that area.^
This failure of Grenville's project to conclude an alliance
with Austria in the autumn of 1794 had momentarily set aside in
England the thought of a close military alliance with any power.
In December, 1794, however, George III himself advised Granville
to reconsider the Austrian alliance project, the chief obstacle
to which was Thugut 's demand for a substantial loan.^^^ The
Emperor's position, on the other hand, was strengthened by his
treaty with Russia on January 3, 1795, which favored his claims
in the Third Partition of Poland. Hence, when Britain, on May 4,
1795, offered him a loan of 4,000,000 pounds, he at once agreed
to maintain an army of 200,000 men for the operation of the year
179$. On May 29th another treaty was signed between England and
Austria, whereby the two powers mutually agreed to guarantee each
other's possessions and to invite Catherine to form with them a
triple alliance for the purpose of maintaining the system pr«>
vailing in western Europe before the French conquests. This
Triple Alliance was concluded on September 2d, 1795. Catherine
engaged herself to supply the other two powers with either
^^Comwallis, Correspondence , op . clt .. II, p. 255.
136lbid .. p. 268.
13 /Hunt, SB. sil', P' 374.
30,000 troops or an equivalent In money. Even with the formation
of this alliance England believed that the deficiency on the
Allies side, caused by Prussia's desertion, had not been rem-
edied. ^^S
On the other hand, the peace treaties concluded between
France and several members of the Coalition added vastly to the
prestige, influence, and strength of the French Republic. How-
ever, Austria and England, her most fortuldable enemies, were still
in the field and still able to wage war against her on land and
sea. Peace with Austria was possible provided that France re-
nounce her annexation policy along the Rhine, llie French people
regarded this Coalition as a Kings' Coalition and this strength-
ened the French Convention's determination to pursue by force the
idea of "Natural Frontiers." In October, 1795, the Convention
took a decisive measure in this concern by voting the annexation
of Austrian Netherlands to France as an integral part of the
Republic. Meantime, the deputies decided to carry on war against
Austria by attacking Southern Germany and Italy. ^•''
Victory did not smile on the French in 1795 in their mili-
tary operations in Germany. For a time, flanking operations of
Jourdan, who advanced along the Main river, and Moreau, who went
down the Danube, were quite successful. As a result many states
of southern Germany consented to peace with France. But the
Archduke Charles, tlie Austrian new coounander in Germany, profited
l^Sftoae, The Struggle , ofi. cit., p. 255.
•^'Gershoy, The French Revolution , op. cit., p. 304.
79
by the treacherous inactivity of General Pichegru, who failed to
support Jourdan. In consequence, Jourdan's army ivas crushed in
several battles, and Moreau was obliged to retreat across tha
Rhine. Furthermore, the Austrians were able to cross the Rhine
and recover part of the territory on the left bank. With this
the fighting ceased till the next spring.^*"
It was in Italy where France, in the year 1796, achieved
her marvelous victories due to the genlvs of the young general,
Bonaparte. Bonaparte advanced in Italy in March, 1796, and de>
feated the Austrians in a series of battles and compelled the
King of Sardinia to abandon the Coalition. He occupied Milan in
May, 1796. The Austrians fell back and garrisoned the strong
fortress of Mantua. In June, 1796, Ferdinand, the King of
Maples, and the Pope made an armistice with the victorious
general.^^^ The Austrian attempt to relieve Italy in the autunm
of 1796 ended in total defeat. Montua surrendered on I'ebz^ary 2,
1797, and Napoleon advanced to Leoben, which is about one hun-
dred miles from Vienna. *
The glorious position which France now held was completed
by the action of Spain, who mistrusted the British activities in
the West Indies and regarded them as a plot against her own
Interests. In October, 1796, she declared war against Britain.
The Mediterranean, already dangerous to the British fleet, now
J|*,°iMd., p. 304.
•^^'Hunt, Ofi. iSii., pp. 38O-3SI.
^^^Ibid.. p. 390.
10
with Spain's enmity seemed to become helpless. The British
Cabinet perforce ordered the evacuation of the Mediterranean.
Corsica and Alba were likewise abandoned. Only Gibraltar was to
be retained, and there a Spanish assult was expected. On the
sea Britain won the battle of St. Vincent over the Spanish fleet
which, if it had been united with that of France, would have
been a formidable Armada. By this victory England assiired her
supremacy as a sea power over her opponents.
The death of Catherine had deprived the Emperor of his hopes
to receive help from Russia, and thus he found no way out of his
difficulties other than seeking peace with France. On April 18,
1797, preliminaries of peace between the Austrian govejmment and
Napoleon were opened in Leoben. Bonaparte offered two alter-
natives. The first was that Austria would cede Belgium to France
and would accept the Rhine as France's frontier, recognizing by
this all the territory on the left bank to be French. In this
case France would restore Milan, Montua, and the continental
territories of Venice, including Istria and Dalmatia to the
Hapsburgs. The second offer was that France should renounce the
acquisition of tha Rhine left bank, being content with the Aus-
trian Netherlands and Liege plus some other frontier towns.
According to this plan, Lombardy and Milan would form an in-
dependent Republic. Austria would obtain in this case the
Venetian possessions north to the Adige and Mlncio and perhaps
143v,atson, ££. fiife., p. 372.
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also the tarrltorjr between Mlncio and the Adda along with Bergano,
Brescia, Qalmatla, and latria. Gallo, the Austrian negotiator,
forwarded those two offers to Thugut on April 13th for careful
consideration. ^^^
Thugut favored a preliaiinary peace rather than a definitive
treaty, because the former needed less tine to conclude and,
therefore, did not require legislative ratification in France.
He preferred the second plan for peace over the first. Belglua
could be ceded, but the integrity of Germany should be stipulated.
The integrity, however, should not prevent any arrangement satis-
factory to France regarding certain bits of territory. France,
on the other hand, should stipulate Austria's indemnity for
Belgium. ^^5
In the Preliminaries of Leoben, signed on April 18, 1797,
each party pledged to promote the internal tranquility of the
other. France would not attempt to revolutionize Austrian sub-
jects, nor would Austria endeavor to restore Monarchy to France.
It was also agreed that the two contracting powers would send
plenipotentiaries to the city of Bern to negotiate and conclude,
within three months, the definitive peace between the two powers.
The Emperor agreed that the Holy Roman Empire would cease also
all acts of hostilities, and a congress formed of the respective
states woiild be held to conclude definitive peace between France
^'^^Biro, OE. £it., II, p. 74«.
^^Ibid.. p, 7«9.
and the Holy Roman Empire. Belgium was to be given to Franca.
Tha Emperor was to be indemnified by the Venetian hinterland be-
tween the Oglio, the Po, and the Adriatic Sea as well as by
Delmatia and I stria. Romagna, Ferrara, and Bologna were to be
given to the Venetian Republic. ^^^
The negotiations for definitive peace took the two coxintries
a long time. Both of them, however, were eager to conclude it.
Austria was exhausted, and public opinion in her country, in-
fluenced by French revolutionary propaganda, was against war. At
this time France was passing through a new phase in her revolu-
tionary development. The coup d' etat of 1797 established in the
Directory the Jacobin's faction who were anxious to conclude
peace with Austria in order to turn their energies to the last
member of the Coalition, England. The negotiations for defini-
tive peace took place in the village of Campo Formio in northern
Italy instead of Bern, and were opened on August 3, 1797. The
Treaty of Campo Formio was based on the Preliminaries of Leoben
and was concluded on October 16, 1797, by Bonaparte and Cobenzl,
the Austrian representative. In this treaty the territorial re-
adjustments agreed upon in the Preliminaries of Leoben were re-
affirmed. In addition, they agreed that the Ionian Islands,
along with the Venetian fleet, were to be taken by France, giving
her a supreme position in the Adriatic. Austria in return would
take the Venetian Islands in the Adriatic and the City of Venice.
Austria recognized the Cisalpine Republic which was created by
Stewart, Documentary Survey . op . cit . . pp. 688-691.
Napoleon in northern Italy. Austria pledged herself to use her
good offices to procure from the Holy Roman Empire the cession
to France of all German lands west of the Rhine. France, In re-
turn, would use her endeavors to secure for the Emperor the Arch-
bishopric of Salzburg and part of southeast Bavaria. If either
party Mas to procure any more acquisitions in Germany, the other
Should be given equivalent indeomlty. The two contracting
parties agreed that the act of ratification of the present treaty
should be exchanged in due form at Rastadt Congress, which was to
include all member states of the Germanic Empire. ^'^^
By the Treaty of Campo Formic the war between France and
Austria, which began in 1792, came to an end. Austria had lost
3,640,000 inhabitants but gained 3|050,000 in Italy. ^^ The two
poivers had thus settled their territorial disputes at the ex-
pense of the Venetian Republic and the lesser states of the Holy
Roman Empire. This Treaty also assured France of a predominant
seat in the German affairs by inviting her to Rastadt Congress.
By this Treaty, Napoleon had achieved his first major diplomatic
triumph. By it he materialized for France the dream of the gener-
ations of having the French frontiers extended to the Rhine.
Another significant result of Campo Formio is that it gave the
fatal blow to the First Coalition by the desertion of Austria.
Sngland now had to fight the formidable enemy alone.
JJJtbid.. pp. 702-709.
^'^^Hose, Tii£ Siijiggia, ££. iil., p. 282.
British Peace Overtures
In July, 1791*, important political changes occurred in
Franca. Robespierre had fallen along with his Terror regiaie.
This ended the dictatorial powers of the Committee of Public
Safety, and the Convention once again retained its supreme con-
trol over the government. To these changes in France's Internal
affairs, King George III referred In his message to Parliament on
October 29, 1794, as being favorable for negotiation. It is,
however, hard to believe that such changes in France, which did
not change the basis of the French foreign policy, were the real
reasons which Induced England to seek peace. Such were the views
of some of the opposition members in the House of Commons, who
Challenged the ministers to tell what changes had taken place in
France's policies that would make England approach her for peace.
The real reasons were certainly other than those the King men-
tioned in his message. The real reasons were to be found in
Pitt's belief that although France was victorious on the con-
tinent, she was, nevertheless, in a stats of exhaustion, and she
would submit to any terms of peace England would propose if some
consideration were given to France's conquests. *' It was evi-
dent now to the British government that although England herself
ight feel secure, thanks to her navy, the war, if continued,
would be a very lengthy one. England, standing alone for most of
her allies had deserted her, could not hope to defeat France on
^^
^Ibld .. pp. 702-709.
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land. Besides, even if England had not been able to achieve her
aims on the continent, she had achieved considerable success in
overseas territories. Her overseas conquests would give England
good grounds for bargaining in the suggested negotiations.
It cannot be said, however, that Pitt was sure or very hope-
ful that auch negotiations would take place, still less that they
would be successful. But his policy was twofold, and he thought
that he would profit in both cases. If such negotiations would
successfully terminate the war, with many of {'England's aims of
the war achieved, then his position would be immensely strength-
ened at home. If France would refuse to make peace, then Pitt's
administration would gain heartier support at home for the finan-
cial and military efforts necessary for probably two more cam-
paigns. ^^^ Hence, the question that had to be considered was
not whether Pitt had been sincere in his attempt to obtain peace,
but rathar if the natiu>e of the terms suggested by England would
be practical and possible enough to expect France to agree.
The first British approach to the French came on May 8,
1795. Wickham, the British minister at the Basle, applied in
writing to his French colleague, Barthelemy, asking whether
France was in favor of a congress consisting of the belligerent
powers for the purpose of concluding a general peace. He also
asked what grounds of pacification France would propose. The
answer came on March 26, 1796, stating that France ardently
desired peace but was in doubt whether the Snglish ministers
^^^Laprade, op. cit., pp. 171-172.
had the same sincere vdshes. France indicated her fears that
the proposed congress might be endless. The Uirectory went on
to say that it was ready to consider any proposals that would
not conflict with the existing law of France. This meant that
France was not ready to discuss anything related to the Austrian
Metherlanda and other territories already annexed by France. The
British government considered this answer as contrary to peace
negotiations and ended the attempt by publishing the two notes
accompanied by an announcement stating that the French policy
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ade the continuation of war absolutely necessary.
Considering Prussian desertion of the Coalition, Austria's
sincerity and determination to continue the war wavering, Aus-
tria's demands for big loans, and the threat of the Irish
revolution, Pitt and his colleagues decided to make a new peace
overture to France. Hence, the second British peace overture to
France was made on September 2, 1796. A request was sent through
the Danish minister in London for a passport for a British diplo-
aat to go to France. The French agreed to receive a British
delegation if it would come to negotiate with full powers, and
they proposed Paris for the purpose. Lord Malmesbury was the
British choice for the task, assisted by Jackson, the British
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minister at Madrid.
The terms of peace to which England was agreeable were as
follows: give to France Savoy, Nice, and all her Rhinish
^51stanhope, ofi. cii., p. 372.
152Laprade, 0£. j£l£., pp. 173-179.
•^
conquests not belonging to Austria, and fcingland to cede back all
the French conquered colonies; and to restore to Holland all her
colonies except the Cape of Good Hope, Ceylon, and Cochin. If
France was absolutely determined to keep the Austrian Netherlands
and Austria was willing to exchange it for Bavaria, then England
would consent to the transfer. Moreover, the Anglo-Austrian Al-
liance stated that England should not make a peace with Franca
that would outstrip Austria of any part of her territory; hence,
England was unable to conclude peace with France without Austria's
consent.^"
In spite of the fact that Malmesbury was supposed to go to
Paris with fUll powers to negotiate, to conclude, and to sign the
agreement, the above-noted consideration limited his freedom of
action. ^^^ Further instructions were sent to him at Paris from
OrenTille, putting more limits on his powers of negotiating. In
a letter dated November 22, 1796, Grenville requested him to
refer to home instructions if the British proposals for peace
would be accepted and the business would turn to consider de-
tails. Furthermore, if Malmesbury met no difficulties, although
Grenville expected many because of England's obligations to her
allies, Malmesbury should refer to home instructions after the
adoption of the general principles of peace. ^^^ Malmesbury,
himself, objected to these limitations in his powers as adverse
^53Adams, 2£. cit .. pp. if6-48.
15Vlalmesbury, 0£. £it.. Ill, pp. 299-300.
^^>Ibid .. pp. 316-317.
Mto dealing with the French successfully. He wrote to Canning,
the British Undersecretary of State, complaining of this situation:
Surely you will not now hesitate to send me a
specific "projet" and broad instructions. If I am
again to go on with Notes and Kemorials, I had better
be recalled; It would only defeat everything good which
has been or may be done, and In the end force me to
give up the business and recall myself .15o
As for the negotiations, Malmesbury suggested that France
enter Into negotiations for the purpose of concluding a general
peace In Europe with England and her allies In particular. When
Delacroix, the French negotiator and Minister for Foreign Affairs,
asked about the possibility of separate peace between France and
England, Malmesbury's answer was in the negative. ^57 Delacroix
expressed the dissatisfaction of the Directory with the British
proposals and considered them no different than those offered at
Basle In 1795. The French did not make any counterproposals but
requested that Malmesbury present new ones. When Delacroix asked
if England would acknowledge the Republic, Malmesbury answered
afflrmatlvely.-'^^^ The rock which blocked the way of the negotia-
tion and prevented its development was Belgium. France was not
ready to discuss this matter since Belgium was already annexed
under the new French constitution as a part of France, and,
hence, the Directory could never change its status. Delacroix
plainly expressed the view that France's Intentions and Interests
were on the continent and not in the colonies. He stated to
^^%ld,, pp. 316-317.
^^''[ibld.. pp. 297-282.
^^^Ibid .. pp. 309-310.
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Haluesbury:
I should be better pleased with an addition of
four villages on the frontiers of tJie Republic than by
acquisition of the richest island among the Antilles,
and should be even sorry to see Pondicherry and Chanden-
agore again belonging to France. 159
Thus, Delacroix emphasized the idea that France would never
give up her nawly annexed Belglc provinces but that she was
agreeable to bargain and to abandon her other conquests In Europe
and the colonies. From November 11, 1796 on, Malmesbury became
more and more disillusioned about the French sincerity for con-
cluding peace. He asked the Directory either to accept his
proposals, based upon the idea of compensatory restitutions as
basis for negotiations, or otherwise to offer some of her own.
The Directory declined, indicating to him that they desired that
the Belgic problem should be above any discussion. Furthermore,
the French suspected Malmesbury' s frequent dispatches to London
as being accounts about France's internal affairs and as trying
to contact certain French reactionary el«nents in Paris. ^ This
accusation was not altogether without grounds. One could find
uch evidence to support It in Malmesbury' s Diaries .gnd Cprye-
BDondence .^°^
Thus, the negotiations reached a deadlock and the French
decided to end it. On December 19, 1796, Delacroix sent Malmes-
bury a note requiring him and his suite to leave Paris within
]1%M'> PP' 331-335. V
loOstanhope, Ofi. fiit
.
, II, p. 403.
^^^Regarding this point see Malmesbury' s dispatches to
London in Malmesbury, ofi. £ii., HI, pp. 289-291, 319-320,
325-329, and 346-347.
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forty-eight hours. Delacroix said in his note that the Directory
would listen to no proposals contrary to the edicts which had
fixed the limits of the French territory. ^^^ Politically, this
last act of the Directory was greatly to the advantage of Pitt's
administration. In spite of Fox's brilliant address, in which he
accused Pitt of not being sincere in his peace overtures, Pitt,
nevertheless, received warm support fron Parllanant and public
opinion alike.
The military and political scene of Europe in 1797 brought
no better prospects for i!>ngland. Austria had received disaster-
ous defeats in Italy, and Napoleon threatened Vienna. By the
Leoben Preliminaries in April, 1797, Austria had come to terms
with France without consulting her ally England. The Triple
Alliance of 1795 was, in fact, dissolved. Paul, who succeeded
16*^
Catherine II, was not in favor of his mother's policies. '
England herself was disabled and endangered by the navy mutinies.
Pitt, seeing England destitute of efficient allies, short of
money, burdened with debts and taxation, and plagued with
mutinies of her fleet, was set on peace. He was encouraged by
the affairs of the parties in France, for in May, 1797, the
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moderates had gained a majority in the legislative councils.
On July 1, 1797, the British government proposed to France
a negotiation for preliminaries of peace which would be arranged
^^^stanhope, qs.. Sit., II, p. 403.
lofRose, TM Struggle. ££. sit., p. 277.
^'''Hunt, OE. s^., pp. 395-396.
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for a future Kuropean congress. This proposal was rejected by
the Directory, who would not allow any concert of action between
England and Austria or any discussion concerning the general
interest of i!>urope. The French, howeyer, would agree to ne-
gotiate with £<ngland for a separate and definitive peace and
suggested Lille for the purpose. '•^-' King George III was not in
favor of these peace overtures. On April 9, 1797, he wrote Pitt
a letter expressing his sentiments in this regard:
I think this country has taken every hiuniliating
step for seeking peace the warmest advocates for that
object could suggest, and they have met with a conduct
from the enemy, bordering on contempt of the same nature;
from any fear of destroying every remaining spark of
vigour in this once firm nation
If the Low Countries remain In the possession of
France, and the former United Provinces continue a De-
partment State of the former, one may talk of balances
of power, but they cannot exist; and the same chain of
reasoning that will admit the above measures will, I
fear, not prevent France from adding all the territory
between her and the banks of the Rhine to her posses-
sions. 166
Grenville took great offense at the French answer and wanted
to stop any further attempt, but Pitt and the majority of the
Cabinet outvoted him, favoring the pursuance of peace negotia-
167
tioas with France. Hence, on the next morning Grenville sent
a dispatch to Delacroix stating the willingness of England to
open negotiations at Lille and naming her representative to be
Lord Malmesbury who would be given full powers. In reference to
J^flMd.. p. 396.
I^^Stanhope, flfi. filj... Ill, Appendix p. iii.
167Adams, og. cit .. p. 56.
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th« id«a of saparate peace, he stated that England would be bound
to negotiate on behalf of her ally, Portugal. *"'
On July 3, 1797, Malmesbury landed on the French soil and
proceeded to Lille where he met the French negotiators, Le Tour-
neur, the Director and head of the legation, and Le Pelley, the
Minister of Marine, and Maret. ^ Malmesbury' s instructions were
ore flexible and broad this time. England would accept the
French annexation of Belgium, Luxemburg, Nice, and Savoy. Eng-
land would also return to France, Spain and Holland and all the
colonies conquered by England, except Trinidad and the Cape,
which she would exchange for Ceylon. ' As a last resort
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Malmesbury would demand no more than Ceylon.
In the second conference held on July 7, 1797, Malmesbury
suggested that England would negotiate on behalf of her ally,
Portugal, while France would represent the Interests of her
allies, Holland and Spain. This was agreed upon. Le Toumeur
commenced by stipulating that no proposals should be made in
contradiction with the Constitution, Laws, and Treaties of
France. This was accepted by Malmesbury, if the same would b*
considered in regard to England, except for the secret articles
in the treaties that Englcuid did not know. This, of course,
172
meant England's recognition of the annexed territories.
In the third conference Malmesbury presented the French
l63stanhope, og. cli., Ill, p. 55.
l69Biro, OE. cU. , II| p. 788.
170Himt, OE. cit., p. 396.
17lAdams, op . cit .. p. 57.
172>iainiesbury, op. cit.. Ill, pp. 381-383.
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legation with a rough project for a peace treaty. In it he
crossed out any exchanges at the expense of France, but main-
tained those at the expense of Spain and Holland. By doing this
he showed disregard for what he had previously agreed upon
respecting the French treaties with Spain and Holland by which
France had guaranteed the territorial Integrity of her allies. ^'3
la this plan of Kalmesbury, England was to keep the Cape, Cochin,
-, . , . . 174
ana irmiaaa. '
The French answer to his plan was not expected by Kalmesbury.
It Involved three preliminary points to which England was re-
quested to yield before any further discussions. The first was
the renunciation of the ancient claim to France included in the
King's title. Second was the restoration of the ships seized at
Toulon or the payment of their value equivalent. Third was the
release of all claims to revenues of the Austrian Netherlands
founded on the English loans to Austria. ^"^^ ah three points
were not of enough significance to block the way for a peace
treaty, but they irritated the British with the preliminary
concessions demanded by the French.
The deadly blow to the Lille negotiation came when, on
July 15, the French informed Malmesbury that all British con-
quests from France or any of her allies must be retunied.
^73Biro, a£. sil-, II f P« 789.
174Adams, ofi. £!£•. PP* 57-58.
I75i.iaime8bury, 2£. sj^.. Ill, pp. 385-389.
That everything the King had conquered ftrom all
and each of his enemies should be restored; and that,
till this restoration was consented to, the negotiation
was not even to begin. 176
The negotiations were prolonged, for the Directory members
were divided into two parties. The Moderates, on the one hand,
favored peace, while the Jacobins were in favor of war. On
September U, 1797, a coup d' atat was effected by the army and
the moderates were condemned to imprisonment, and the Jacobin
elements, the war party, held power. Two new French negotiators
were sent to Lille and asked Malmesbury if he would agree to
restoration of all British conquests. When he said that this
was beyond his powers, he was ordered to leave France in twenty-
four hours. 177 By doiog this the third British peace overture
had failed and the conflict ccntinued between the two powerful
enemies, one vho was master of the seas, and the other master
of the land.
In summary, the victories of the French over the armies of
the First Coalition in 1793 were followed in the years between
1793 and 1793, not only by more military victories, but by amaz-
ing diplomatic successes as well. The Peace of Basle was the
first fatal diplomatic blow to the First Coalition, by which
PruBsia assumed an attitude of neutrality. The United Provinces,
in her peace treaty of 14ay, 1795, with France, not only with-
drew from the Coalition but also allied herself to France and
177Ro8e, TOfi Struggle . 2e. cit. . p. 279.
wdeclared war on England. Finally Austria, after a series of
disasterous defeats, signed the Peace of Campo Formlo with
France, by which France became the supreme power of Europe.
England's counteractions against the French diplomatic suc-
cesses were met with complete failure In this period 1793-1798.
Her sea victories over the French were of no material aid to the
allied armies in the continent, l^gland tried by all means not
to let Prussia and Austria sign peace with France. She offered
thera subsidies and promised to satisfy their territorial ambi-
tions, but her labors bore no fruit and her allies deserted her
and signed peace with France without even consulting her. Seeing
the failure of the First Coalition, England tried on three dif-
ferent occasions to approach France in order to negotiate peace.
These British peace overtures took place in 1795, 1796, and
1797. The major reason for all these overtures was the dis-
ability of England to beat France in the military field. The
major purposes for the British government to extend these over-
tures were: her desire to end that costly and hopeless war;
she hoped that by giving way to France in some continental ques-
tions she could gain some of her overseas conquests; and she
thought that by these overtures she could gain more support of
the British public opinion and hinder the activities of the
British malcontents. All those three overtures were extended by
the British government under a false assumption that France was
on the point of breaking down, was bankrupt, and that she was
eager to accept any British terms. Hence, under these circum-
stances. It is not strange to describe the British peace proposals
In the first and second overtures as being Impractical for the
situation and position of France. The failure of the third
peace overtiire could be referred to the uncomproffllslng attitude
of the Franch. In fact, both sides desired peace if each of
theiB could have his terns to prevail. Since that was impossible
and a conpronlae was necessary, each of them felt that he could
realise his aims by continuation of war. The British felt
secure on their Island under the protection of their fleet and
could easily continue a long war. The French, on the other
hand, were victorious on the continent and felt at the time that
England could not stop their plans.
VI
THE SECOiiD COALinON
Military and Ulplomatic Developman ts
Following the Treaty of Campo Formio, the monarchs of
Europe looked complstely helpless in face of the French domina-
tion. This treaty dealt a decisive blow to the traditional
systea of Europe in general, and In Oaraany and Italy in partic-
ular. In Italy the partition of the Venetian Republic betwemi
France and Austria and the creation of Cisalpine and Llgurian
Republics gave France a supreme position In northern Italy.
France, also, by her new position in Italy, overawed the King
of Sardinia and controlled the Adriatic. In Germany the changss
were no less significant. France now was holding the left bank
of the Rhine. Because of the strife between Austria and Prussia
and because of the power of her eneaies. Franca obtained a pre-
doninatlng position in the Rastadt Congress which was, according
to the Treaty of Campo Formio, to arrange peace between France
and the Holy Roman bmplre.
The Rastadt Congress was opened in December, 1797. The
principle of the integrity of the Eaplre acknowledged by tha
Campo Formio Treaty was abandoned, and the cession of the left
bank territory to France was agreed upon. Although Salzburg was
given to Austria by the Campo Formio Treaty, France opposed its
cession. By playing Prussia and Austria against each other, she
was able to secure the adoption of her policies by the Congress.
Tha Congress, however, fell into endless arguments concerning
the method of compensating the German princes for the loss of
their possessions to Franc* and ths problem of satisfying th«
anbitions of the two large German powers, Prussia and Austria,
i7d
at the expense of other German states.
In Novenber, 1797, the King of Prussia died and his son,
Frederick William III, succeeded him. The new King did not re-
gard the Treaty of Campo Formio with easiness, nor did he weleos*
the increasing French influence in German affairs. But he,
nevertheless, distrusted Austria and feared the dangers that his
country would be involved in If he were to abandon his father's
neutralist policy established by the Treaty of Basle. ^79 He
always listened to the Duke of Brunswick, brother-in-law of
George III, who saw with concealed dismay the progress of the
French armies and their influence in Germany. Both Pitt and
Crenville shared the belief of George III that Brunswick could
be persuaded to exert his influence at Berlin for the purpose of
overthrowing the Chancellor Haugwitz, to whose policy the Treaty
of Basle was ascribed. Crenville thought that the young King
Right be made the chief Instrument in forming a Quadruple Alli-
ance—consisting of Russia, Austria, Great Britain, and Prussia—
ido
to relieve Europe of French domination.
The peace party at the Court of Berlin headed by Prince
Henry was all powerful. The Chancellor, Haugwits, was attached
to this party. Thus the young King, although aware of the
^^^John Holland Rose, "The Second Coalition," Wj Cambridge
Modern History . VIII, (London: Cambridge University Press , 1934 )
,
p. 6if2. Hereafter cited as Rose, The Second Coalition .
179Rose, The Struggle, op. cit., p. 283.
l°"Oropmore . op . clt .. IV, p. 8.
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dangers involved in the policies of this party, was not able to
oppose it and, hence, he fell under its influence. The Duke of
Brunswick tried to induce the young King to alter his father's
policy manifested in the Treaty of Basle and to adopt a new line
of policy to check the French influence by cooperating with
England. He urged him to bring an end to the unwise policies of
Haugwitz. The King's answer was that although he was deeply im-
pressed by the rising danger to Kurope from France's domination,
he, nevertheless, believed that the circumstances and mot-'va-
tions which led his father to conclude the Peace of Basle still
stood. He also stated that he still had confidence in Haugwitz
and his policies. ^^^ Thus, the British diplomatic activity in
Berlin did not produce the hoped for results at this time.
It was a mistake to regard the Peace of Campo Formio as a
definitive peace between the two powers concerned. The sphere
of their interests was only artificially defined. Beside the
fact that Austria signed that peace under the threat of French
bayonets, and Austria could not feel happy in seeing France's
dominance in Italy and Germany, Austria wanted time to reorganiia
her amies and to prepare for a future day. Austria did not
believe that the Rastadt Congress could bring her any better
prospects. Contrarywise, she was more alarmed in seeing the
French at the Congress insisting on maintaining their policy of
predominance in Europe. Such being the case, it was but natural
'•^^Ibid., pp. 23, 25.
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for Austria to awfid new overtures to S^ngland. Thugut suggested
that England and Austria must first come to an understanding with
each other on certain essential points in order to fix the basis
for a Quadruple Alliance against France. These essential points
to Thugut were: (1) Financial aid to Austria, which must be a
liberal subsidy rather than a loan; (2) Great Britain's ability
to continue this aid during the year 1799; and (3) the dispatch
of a British fleet to the Mediterranean for the protection of
Kaples.-^^^
Pitt eagerly welcomed the prospect of a new coalition, but
he and Orenville doubted that Parlianent would agree to grant a
subsidy to Austria. Lord Spencer, first Lord of the Admiralty,
regarded it above the ability of the British Navy to dispatch
a squadron to the Mediterranean at the present time. Hence,
Grenvllle's answer to the Austrian proposal was that the British
govemisent would fully support the idea of a Quadruple Alliance.
He agreed that England would take the risk and send a fleet to
the Mediterranean if the King of Naples would open his ports to
It, and if Austria would undertake to defend Nsples against
France. Grenville, however, declined to discuss the question of
subsidy until the brnperor had ratified the Convention of Kay,
1797.^^ Orenville also asked the Austrian govornment, as a
^!^i]ild.. P- xlx.
^"'Thls convention was held in London between the Austrian
Aabassador and the British officials and arranged the way by
which Austria was to pay her loan of 1795 to Lngland. The Em-
peror declined ratifying this convention, an act which irritated
the British government and Parliament and was regarded as a re-
fusal from Austria to fulfill her obligations.
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sign of reestablishing confidence between the two countries, to
disclose the secret articles of the Treaty of Campo Formio to
England. '^^ The British answer caused irritation in Vienna
where Thugut did not expect such demands from the British. This
was expressed in a letter to Grenville from Starhemberg, the
Austrian Ambassador at London. This letter went on to say that
if England would pledge to furnish Austria with the supplies
necessary for the campaign and with an unconditional subsidy
promising non-interference with Austrian military operations,
then Austria would ratify that conTention. GrenTllle's comment
on this Austrian reply was that England could not accept this
contrasting attitude of the British honor with Austrian bad
faith. 1°5 Thus, this correspondence bore nothing except more
distrust between the two governments and, as a result, their
diplomatic relations cooled off for the time being.
It is then not wrong to say that England in the early
months of the year 1798 seemed not to have the smallest chance
of arousing the continent against France. Her finances showed
only a slight recovery from the recent monetary crisis. Ireland,
where signs of a rebellion were gathering, foreshadowed the
gravest dangers. This danger was many times multiplied by fear
of French expeditions to Ireland. This fear was materialized on
August 22, 1790, when three French frigates landed seven hundred
soldiers in the Bay of Killala. Immediately this snail force
^^Dropmore . ag* £ii« » IV» P* 8.l^
^Ibid .. pp. 250-252.
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took possession of the tovm of KlUala. Another French force
arrived in the Irish waters in October but was scattered by the
British warships. The French force in Killala was easily over-
come by British troops and was obliged to surrender without being
able to make a connection with the Irish rebels. °° This was
not all that embittered the strife between England and Franca.
From October 31, 1796, the Diractory had decreed a law excluding
all British goods from all lands over which France had control
and authorized the capture of such goods, even on neutral ships.
Cotton and woolen goods, together with hardware, pottery, and
refined sugar were to be considered as of British origin, and
their importation was forbidden under threat of confiscation.
The execution of these measures and efforts to impose them on
Spain and Holland produced the utmost degree of anger in Eng-
land.l«7
Several developments took place on the Italian scene and
added both to the French stronghand in the area and to the heat-
ing of the conflict between France and Austria. In northern
Italy the French held supreme power, which was not counterbal-
anced by any matching power in central and southern Italy. In
this area there was the feeble power of the Papal States in the
center and the feudal Kingdom of the Two Sicilies in the south.
l^^Bavid C. Douglas, ed., English Historical Documents . XI,
(London: fcyre and Spottiswoode, 1955), pp. 892-893. Hereafter
cited as English Historical Documents .
i^VCeorge Duruy, ed.. Memoirs of Barras . translated Charles
E. Roche, III, (London: Osgood, Mcllvaine & Co., 1916), p. 172.
Hereafter cited as Barraa Memoirs .
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Th«r« was a powarful rapublican faction In these areas which,
with the guidance of the French agents and diplomats, was aiming
at the establishment of a republican state. The French Directory
wanted to spread her influence southward and to conquer Rome in
order to stamp out the Papacy and capture its rich treasures
which might be a remedy for France's bankrupt finances. On Feb-
ruary 15, 1798, as a result of republican demonstrations around
the French embassy at Rome which the Papal horsemen tried to
disperse, a member of the French legation was mortally wounded.
The French army at once marched to Rome and it surrendered with-
out resistance. Thereupon, the Pope was forced to leave Rome to
188
Tuscany, and Rome was proclaimed a Republic.
Even more disastrous to the good fame of the French Republic
was the occupation of Switzerland. Bonaparte, in Paris, recom-
mended such a step to the Directory. A reason for intervention
was found in the agitation which took place in that country
during the closing months of 1797, and this led a few of the
natives to call on the French for Intervention against the Swiss
oligarchy. In the last week of January, 1798, French troops
entered Switzerland and occupied the country without any serious
resistance. Plunder followed as in the case of Italy, and eight
million francs were taken from the Swiss treasury and were con-
tributed to the Egyptian expedition waiting now in Toulon. A
republic following th« French model was established in Swltzer-
^^^iid., p. 175.
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land under the nane of Helvetic Republic.
Due to the weakness of the French Navy, Bonaparte advised
the Directory against the plan of invading England. Instead
he recommended the conquest of Egypt, and this was discussed a
long time without making a final decision. The conquest of the
fertile Egypt was to Bonaparte only a preliminary step for at-
tacking India and establishing a French empire in Asia and
Africa. In Bonaparte's mind such conquest would surely open
new markets for French goods and meantime would ruin the back-
bone of the English strength—their commerce. Another reason
for the Bgyptian expedition was that the Directory wanted to
send away those military men—Bonaparte in particular—whose
ambitions could not be satisfied in the now quiet European scene,
for their stay in France might be dangerous to the civilian demo-
190
eratic regime of France. Under the warm sun of the summer
Bonaparte set sail fro* Toulon on May 19i 179d. On June 12th
he captured Malta and proceeded to Alexandria, which he sur-
prised and easily captured. At the end of July, Bonaparte had
191
won the Battle of the Pyramids and entered Cairo victoriously.
Important consequences followed the French landing in Egypt.
One of these was the Battle of the Nile. England, without yet
knowing about the Egyptian expedition, had dispatched a squadron
1^9i,oui8 Adolphe Thiers, History ^f the French Revolution ,
translated, Frederick Shoberl, IV, (Philadelphia: Carey and Hart,
1845), pp. 250-251.
190Barras Memoirs . 2£. cit .. pp. 207-208.
'^iRose, The Struggle , op. cit., p. 285.
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to the Mediterranean under the command of Nelson. When ha heard
about this expedition, Nelson searched for it in all possible
directions. Finally when he found the French fleet lying at
Abuokir Bay near Alexandria, he attacked it promptly and won a
crushing victory on August 1, 1798. Out of the thirteen French
sails of the line and four frigates, only two ships and frigates
were able to escape, the rest being either sunk or captured by
the English. ^92 This victory of Nelson's not only shut Napoleon
up in Egypt but also established the British naval supremacy in
the Mediterranean.
Another area that enkindled the war in Europe was in Naples.
The news of the Battle of the Nile threw the Royal family of
Naples into a higher pitch of enthusiasm and into daring schemes
against the French in Italy. They now decided to expel the
French from Rome, in spite of the warnings from Vienna and
Iiondon advising against such an ill-planned scheme. They were
encouraged in their plan by Nelson and the British Ambassador at
Naples, who had a strong personal friendship with the Neapolitan
Royal family. ^^^ Hence, on October 23, 1798, the Neapolitan
army crossed the borders and attacked Rome, and the French evac-
uated it because of their inferior numbers. But this victory
of the Neapolitans was short-lived. On December 9, 1798, the
French attacked Rome and won an easy victory over their enemy,
driving them back to Naples. In December the Royal family fled
^^^English Historical Documents . ©£. clj., pp. 890-891.
^^^Kose, JM Second Coalition. 2£. £i1^., p. 651.
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from Naples to Sicily, and on January 23, 1799, the French oc-
cupied Naples and established the Parthenopean Republic.
"*
The rupture with Naples made the French Directory decide
to pursue vigorous action in northern Italy. They had long
wanted to settle things with Piedmont. Looking at a European
war as certain, they now sent their troops to Turin, using as
a justification for this action the disorder in that Kingdom
as a result of the republican agitation. Charles Emmanuel IV,
King of Piedmont, was obliged to abdicate his throne on Decem-
ber 9, 1796, and to retire to the island of Sardinia. An in-
demnity of 10,300,000 francs was imposed over Piedmont, an action
which caused widespread revolt and weakened the French position
195
in northern Italy.
These French acts in Italy, Switzerland, and £gypt brought
widespread reaction in the European capitals. Austria saw the
balance of interest established by the Treaty of Campo Formio
altered to her great disadvantage. As a result of the conquest
of iigypt, Turkey declared war against France on September 11,
1798. Paul I of Russia, who had much hatred for the Revolution
which was now coupled with the endangering of his interests in
the Ottoman £mpire by the French, reversed the policy of his
mother and concluded an alliance with Turkey on December 23,
1798.196
194Barras Memoirs , op . cit .. pp. 366-367.
195Rose, The Struggle
. 2£- SAl' t P* 654.
196Bj.inton, q^. si^., p. 230.
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Rise and Fall of the Second Coalition
The relations between England and Austria had been strained
after the conclusion of the Campo Formio Treaty when Austria
deserted the First Coalition. Suspicion and distioist clouded
their relations in this period and prevented any open discussion
for improving them. What irritated England most was that Austria
showed signs of disinterest in paying back her loan of 1795 to
England. The events of the year 1798| however, made both sides
agreeable to an understanding with one another in order to co-
operate against their common foe—France.
Count Cobentzl, who took the place of Thugut as a Minister
for Foreign Affairs, went to Petersburg to encourage the Czar
to bring closer relations between the two Courts. He tried to
convince the Czar to help in regard to two points: (1) To pre-
vail on the King of Prussia to guarantee the neutrality of all
Germany, so as to leave the Emperor free to employ his own forces
in Italy and Switzerland, and (2) to obtain a promise of an ade-
quate subsidy from England before ratifying the financial conven-
tion of May, 1797. Relative to this negotiation Count
Moronzow, the Russian Ambassador at London, was Instructed by
the Czar to discuss with British officials the points of differ-
ence between England and Austria. In August, 1793, Grenvill*
told the Russian Ambassador that unless Austria ratified the
convention of May, 1797, the British govexTiment could not secure
^^TpropBore
. aE« Sit-i IV, pp. 293-294.
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the approval of Parliament for any new subsidy to her. If
Austria would make the ratification, then England would enter
into negotiations with her concerning the military operations
in Switzerland and thu Mediterranean and would cooperate in
employing the subsidized Russian army. ^9° Objections to Aus-
trian subsidies were not limited to Parliament, for some of the
Cabinet were also not agreeable. The Minister, Lord Loughborough,
wrote to Pitt on October 5, 1798, concerning this, saying that
the Austrian request for British subsidy without ratifying the
convention of 1797 "is irrational and unjust."^^'
England still distrusted the Austrian policies. Grenville
wrote in this regard on October 4, 1798:
The Councils of Austria are still wavering and ir-
resolute, and if the insolence of the Directory is so
far humbled by this last blow, 200 as to induce them to
hold out fresh lures to Vienna of acquisitions in Italy,
I would not answer for it that the Austrians might not
catch at bait, though they see the hook, which it no
longer conceals. 201
The British answer to the Czar concerning his effort of
uediation did not please him. Hence, he postponed cooperation
with &igland until she was prepared to enter into agreement with
Austria. From her side England felt that the state of affairs
in the two Courts at this time was still not favorable for a
successful negotiation. The best thing for England to do,
therefore, was to wait until the other two Courts changed their
l^^Ibid., p. 298.
1991^., p. 335.
200xhe Battle of the Kile.
^Ol propmore
. ££. sll' , IV, p. 335.
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attitudes. Grenvlll* wrote to Pitt in this regard on October 28,
17981 that the victory of the British fleet in the Mediterranean
still had no important effect at Vienna. Britain had to wait
for better proposals from Vienna. ^^^ Thus the whole plan of a
new coalition, which England was eager to see, was threatened to
fall to the ground. Count Woronzow saved cutting off the ne-
gotiations by sending his master a dispatch assuring him that
It was not in the hands of the British government, but rather in
those of the Parliament to grant a subsidy to Austria.^''-' Paul,
however, was always eager to cooperate with England, and he be-
came more eager after the French occupation of Malta and Egypt.
The Maltese affairs touched Paul more than anything else.
The Order of St. John of Jerusalem, ^0^ as now reconstituted and
settled in Paul's palace, had proclaimed him as their Grand
Master. He was, therefore, interested in Malta. England, ex-
ploiting this point of weakness in the Czar, at once recognized
his new title. This eased many difficulties standing in the
way of an Anglo-Russian Alliance. During July, 1798, Paul made
an overture to the British government for an offensive alliance.
Pitt, in a letter to Grenville dated August 18, 1798, eagerly
welcomed the Russian proposal. He said in this letter:
^"'A military society established in the thirteenth Century
as a part of the Crusades efforts in the Holy Land. After their
expulsion from the Holy Land they established themselves in
Malta as a basis for their operations. They continued in Malta
till Bonaparte expelled them from the Island.
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If I thought there could be any hesitation or dif-
ference of opinion on the subject of the answer to be sent
to Huasia, I shoulu not lose a moment in coming to town.
But I am persuaded we shall all agree most cordially In
going as far to meet this overture as our pecuniary re-
,: sources will allow, 205
He continued to say that if Russia would furnish the field
with 60,000 men, Great Britain would engage herself to pay
300,000 pounds at the time of ratification and 100,000 pounds
per month later on. At the end of the war an additional allow-
ance of 50,000 pounds or even 70,000 pounds per month would be
paid for a period during which the agreement would be in opera-
tion. 20" Negotiations continued and finally ended with the
signing of the alliance on December 29, 179^* This agreement
bound the two powers together in a close allianca with the gen-
207
•ral aim of bringing France into her pre-Revolution boundaries.
This agreement required England to pay the sum of 225,000 pounds
as preparation money, and to pay a monthly subsidy of 75,000
pounds. After th« conclusion of peace, further paymant at a
rata of 37,000 pounds per month would ba paid. Russia on her
sida would furnish the campaign with 45,000 troops. 208
In the King's message to Parliament about this Anglo-
Russian Alliance he said:
His Majesty thinks proper to acquaint this House
that he had, some time since, concluded an eventual
engagement with his good brother and ally, the £mperor
of Russia, for employing 45,000 men against the common
enemy, in such manner as the state of affairs in Europe
2°^Lropmore . ojb. jEii., IV, p. 2fi3.
20oibid
.. p. 283.
20Vftose, TJjs Second Coalition . 0£. sit., p. 648.
^P
^Hansard's Debates . XaXIV, p. 1043.
mat that period appeared to render most advantageous. '
Thus, one of the large powers had now come to the side of
Sngland In her fierceful struggle against France. This alliance
made the British hopes for forming a coalition against France
run high. Russia, in particular, because she had no territorial
ambitions to gain from the war, was trusted by both the Courts
of Vienna and Berlin. Since the Busslan army was expected to
act in the West with a Prussian force, Grcnville cherished high
hopes of inducing Prussia to take up arms for the liberation of
Holland. Cooperation with Prussia almost necessarily Involved
alienation from Austria. Accordingly, since Austria was still
maintaining her suspicious reserve, Grenville turned all his
energies to bring Prussia to an luiderstanding. Hence, Grenville
dispatched his brother Thomas on a special mission for the pur-
pose of arranging an Anglo-Russo-Prussian Alliance. But the
Influence of the French party at Berlin was prevailing and the
King of Prussia decided to stand aloof and Thomas Grenville'
s
mission failed 210
In the closing month of the year 1798, when a continental
war seemed eminent, Grenville sent proposals to Petersburg for
the purpose of making plans to face the expected consequences.
The proposals stated that Prussia should be persuaded to inter-
vene, but this could not be expected before operations had begun
to expel the French from Holland. Granville wished that the
^°9ibid.. p. 1042.
210R^ii, The Struggle, op. cit., p. 290.
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general aims of such a coalition be specified and those of each
member stated. He wanted by this to avoid contradiction in
aims—a situation which had contributed to the failure of th*
First Coalition. Orenville asked the Czar to formulate the
articles of the proposed Quadruple Alliance in order to present
them to the Courts of Vienna and Berlin. Grenvllle, however,
suggested the following as leading provisions: the reduction of
France to her limits before the Revolution, the independence of
Switzerland, the union of Holland and Belgium under the Prince
of Orange, and the restoration of the Kingdom of Sardinia and
the integrity of Germany. The proposals continued to state that
Austria should be contented vdth the recovery of Lombardy, and
the King of Prussia should be asked to state what acquisitions
he had in view. In order to obtain the necessary cooperation
between Austria and Prussia, the Czar would guarantee to each
the observance by the other of the condition agreed upon in the
proposed treaty. ^'•^ Orenville' s letter of proposals ended by
saying to Vihitworth:
His Majesty has been induced by his entire rsliance
on the sentiments and principles of the Emperor of Russia
to enable you to open yourself thus fully and confidenti-
ally on all the different points which respect the final
settlement of Europe. But Important as these details are,
it is still more so that some adjustment should be made
by the powerful intervention of the Emperor of Russia,
who can alone quiet the jealousies of Austria and Prussia,
and by his guarantee give to those powers a confidence
in the mutual execution of their aigagements to each
other. 212
^^^Dropmore . ag. £i£., IV, pp. 327-329-
212ibid., p. 3«0.
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On Dscember 30, 179d, the Czar replied to Lord Grenville's
proposals. He said that he had spared no effort to form a strong
coalition against Prance~(l) By offering to mediate between
England and Austria, a matter in which he still hoped that Eng-
land would agree to subsidise Austria; (2) by sending an army
to support the King of Naples; ^^^ and (3) by asking the King of
Prussia to join hands in forming a Quadruple Alliance with the
following conditions: Russia would aid him with 45,000 troops
and iWigland with 900,000 pounds for executing the campaign of
Holland; the union of Holland and Belgiua; and the liberty of
the Prussian King to enlarge his domains at the expense of France.
Austria, the Caar continued, had consented to these provisions
and he had encouraged Austria to take the Initiative in opening
the campaign. The Czar also suggested that the Pope should be
restored to Rome. '^ *
The Anglo-Russian Alliance of December, 1798, was a suc-
cessful basis for further closer cooperation between the two
countries as well as for the formation of the Second Coalition.
In January, 1799, England Joined the Turkish-Russian Alliance.
The Turkish and Russian fleets worked Jointly In the Eastern
Mediterranean against the French in the Ionian Islands and the
Adriatic. This enabled the British fleet to concentrate its
213vihen Naples was endangered by the French, Paul sent an
army to help her and which was to pass through Austrian terri-
tory. But this army, in fact, did not reach Naples when it
was capitulated by the French. It was not until 1797 that the
Russian troops were sent to Italy.
^^
^Uropmore . ajg. ^1^., IV, pp. 427-W9.
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operation In the western part of that sea and around the coasts
of £gypt. Both powers, Russia and England, had concluded
treaties of assistance with the King of Naples. The Russian
troops marched to Galicia and waited for the opening of hostil-
ities in order to assist the King of Naples. ^^^ Upon hearing
about the Anglo-Russian Alliance, the French Directory, through
her plenipotentiaries at Rastadt, threatened to leave the Cong-
ress if Austria would permit the Russian troops to pass through
her territory. Also, the Directory tried to make overtures to
Russia to win her over and to prevent the creation of a new
coalition which now seemed serious. They offered the Czar a
plan for partitioning the Ottoman Empire, an idea which inter-
ested many of the Russian Ministers, but the Czar was resolved
51 ft
to act on the side of England and rejected the French plans.
These events of the year 1793, the conclusion of the Anglo-
Russian Alliance, and the serious steps which the Czar was taking
by marching his troops assured the Austrian government that her
problems with France must be settled by the sword and that she
would not stand in the field alone. She was resolved now to go
to war and take advantage of the Russian military aid. On Jan-
uary 31, 1799, the French plenipotentiaries at Rastadt warned
the Austrian envoy that war would ensue if they were not Informed
within fifteen days of the retreat of Russian troops from Aus-
trian territory. The Austrian government returned no answer.
215Rose, The Second Coalition , op. cit., p. Ski.
^^^Barras Memoirs , op. cit., p. 387.
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Hence, on March 1, 1799, two French armies crossed the Rhine and
Austria declared war on March 12, starting by that act the war
of the Second Coalition. This Coalition now Included Austria,
Russia, England, Portugal, Naples, Sardinia, and Turkey. On
March 25, while the French envoys at Rastadt were still negotia-
ting with smaller German states, the Austrian Archduke Charles
won a great battle over the French at Stockach. On April 8, the
Austrian Emperor launched a declaration dissolving the Congress
of Rastadt.
^^'''
For the arrangement of the operations of the campaign an
alliance was concluded between Austria and Russia for the pur-
pose of dispatching 60,000 Russian troops and the fierce fighter
Suvoroff to assist the Austrians in northern Italy. This ex-
pedition, however, was delayed until the end of March, 1799, when
it entered Vienna. At once a dispute arose between the two gov-
ernments about the command of the operations. Austria wanted the
Russians to be merely Instrumental in her hands and for her aims.
Another Russian army, commanded by Korsakoff to operate on the
Rhine and subsidised by British money, marched westward at the
end of April, 1799. Dispute again took place between England and
Austria in regard to the employment of this army. Austria pointed
to the Palatinate while England wanted to invade Switzerland as a
preliminary to an Austro-Russlan Invasion of the French province,
French-Comte. Finally, the British opinion on this point pre-
Rose, The Second Coalition , og. cit., p. 655-
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vailed. 21*
In the military field in Italy, Suvoroff , the Commander of
the allied forces, defeated the French in a series of battles
and drove them out of Milan and Turin. The French, who were
hampered by the riainga of Italian peasantry, were obliged to
evacuate all of Italy and to take the defensive at Genoa. 2^°
As a result, the Roman, Cisalpine, and Parthenopean Republics
fell. Paul I now ordered the restoration of the King of Sar-
dinia to Turin, an action which upset the Austrian Emperor who
was looking for the annexation of all of northern Italy. The
Emperor wanted to get rid of Suvoroff in Italy. He suggested
to London that Suvoroff be transferred to Switzerland as a pre-
liminary for the invasion of French-Comte. To secure the ac-
ceptance of the Czar, Grenville first made the proposal to him,
and when Paul agreed, Francis II expressed his approval of Paul's
wish. Suvoroff, who was planning to attack Hice, received the
new instructions with indignation. He was ordered to break the
French defense in Switzerland, to find subsistence in the central
area of that country, and to Join Korsakoff near Zurich. Such a
plan was far from being practical or wise. It ignored the many
220
difficult problems which Suvoroff was required to overcome.
It signified one of the serious mistakes of the masters of the
Second Coalition where the civilians drew military plans on paper
21%ose, The Struggle , oe. cit., p. 291.
219Barra s Memoirs , op . cit .. pp. 416-418.
220Rose, The Struggle . o£. si^., p. 212.
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to b« forwarded to the armies for execution.
Switserland was to see the most dramatic disasters of th«
allies brought by their jealousies. Suvoroff was slow in his
progress, while Korsakoff was defeated by Massena at Zurich.
Another Austrian corps sent to help Suvoroff was also driven out
of Switzerland by the French. Suvoroff, with his almost starving
Ben, forced their way and captured several French posts and
entered Lindan in the central area of Switzerland. He refused,
thenceforth, to cooperate with the Austrians and retired to his
winter quarters on October 30. Thus, the plan which, with in-
telligent cooperation between the two Russian armies and that of
the Archduke Charles, might have laid Switzerland at the feet of
the Allies, led to failure in achieving their planned objectives
221
and ruined the hopes of the Coalition.
The autumn of 1799 was dlsasterous to the Allies, not only
in Switzerland but also in Holland. On June 22, 1799, Pitt made
a convention with Russia for a joint invasion of Holland. On
the part of England the principle object was the capture of the
Dutch fleet in the Texel and the destruction of the naval depot,
which deprived France of any naval aid from Holland, while both
the allied powers hoped to follow up the Archduke Charles' suc-
cesses by threatening the French frontier. Russia promised to
supply 17,000 troops to be subsidized by England, while England
would send 13,000 men. On August 27th a British force of 10,000
^^^Rose, TJje Second Coalition , og. £it., pp. 661-662.
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men landed on the Dutch coast. The Dutch seamen, who were at-
tached to the House of Orange, rose against their officers and
surrendered to the British. Thirteen ships were thus captured
by the British. The British and Russian troops, however, were
not able to make any advance on land, and they were shut up on
a little strip of land on the coast. The invasion failed, and
the British troops were withdrawn to England while the Russian
222troops were stationed in the channel islands.
This failure of the allied forces in Switzerland and Hol-
land angered the Czar, He accused Austrian policy, under Thugut
direction, as being dictated by the anxiety of acquiring Pied-
mont. He was irritated by the support which Thugut had received
from the British government in regard to his plan in executing
the war. He believed that his troops were sacrificed in Switzer-
land to Austrian selfishness, and that they were not well treated
in the Dutch campaign, and that they were badly provided for In
the channel Islands. In December, 1799, he wrote to his Ambas-
sador at London that he Intended to recall his troops and to
abandon the Coalition. He further said that he would, however,
during the winter of 1799-1800, leave them in their present
quarters, hoping that those in the channel islands might be used
against the Biscay coast of France in the spring, as it vjas pre-
viously planned. He said that he would remain In the Coalition
on the condition that Thugut would be dismissed and Austria would
renounce her system of excessive acquisitions. Thugut was not
222Hunt, ££. sit., pp. 430-431.
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dismissed and England, planting her hopes on the successes of
the Austrian armies, was not able to ease the Czar's fury. Thus,
the C»ar abandon3d the Coalition, an act which was the fatal blow
223
to its very existence. •'
Soon the Austrian armies proved to be no match to the French
under the leadership of Bonaparte, who landed on the southern
French coast on October 9, 1799. He at once set to work and
overthrew the Directory and established himself as First Consul
with almost dictatorial powers, b-ngland tried to face the con-
ditions by backing Austria to whom she granted a subsidy of
2,000,000 pounds on June 20, ISOO.^^'* But nothing was to stand
in the way of the genius and ambitions of Bonaparte, who, as he
had brought Austria to her knees in 1797, had decided now to re-
peat the same story. In the middle of June, 1800, he won the
decisive victory of Marengo in Italy over the Austrians and
forced them to sign the separate peace of Luneville on February 9,
1801. Thus, the Second Coalition was torn to pieces, and England
was again forced to face her formidable enemy alone.
In summary, England seemed to have no chance in arousing the
continent against France in the early months of 1798. Prussia
insisted on staying neutralist, while distrust and complications
prevailed over the Anglo-Austrian relations and prevented any
fruitful cooperation between them. By the end of the year 1798,
Important events happened that turned the tide to England's
223Hose, The Struggle . Ofi. ci£. , pp. 295-296.
2^^Ibid .. pp. 296-297.
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advantage. One of these important things was France's new con-
quests in Italy, Switzerland, and Egypt. These actions aroused
the European powers, particularly Austria and Paul I of Russia.
The latter was especially concerned about Malta, which Bonaparte
had occupied, and believed that the French Revolutionary prin-
ciples should bo stamped out by force. This attitude of Paul
was skilfully exploited by the English diplomacy. As a result
an Anglo-Russian treaty of alliance was signed in December, 1798.
Austria, on the other hand, became convinced now that France's
ambitions could not be satisfied, and the balance of interest had
been altered to Austria's great disadvantage by the new French
actions of aggression. Also, the Anglo-Russian alliance and the
British naval victory in the Battle of the Nile assured the Aus-
trian government that she would not stand alone against France,
and her chances for winning the war had become more promising.
The Russian troop movements on Austrian territory excited France,
and war broke out in March, 1799.
The allied armies were able to achieve important victories
in the year 1799, and to threaten France itself; but soon the
allies were to receive a series of cnishing defeats. These de-
feats were, in the first place, due to differences between the
allies in their aims and military operations. Russia accused
Austria of mistreating the Russian troops and, by trying to
achieve selfish aims, disregarding former agreements between the
allies. Therefore, Russia withdrew from the war in the winter
of 1799-1800.
The return of Napoleon to France in October, 1799, and his
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assumption of power gave France new strength to cope with her
enemies, who were much weakened by the Russian withdrawal. It
was but natural then for the allies to be defeated by Napoleon
and for Austria to seek a separate peace with France. This peace
was realized in Febiruary, 1801, by the Treaty of Luneville which
Barked the full collapse of the Second Coalition.
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CONCLUSIONS . .
A traditional concern of European politics of the eight-
eenth century was the balance of power. In the event that a
power became much stronger than the other powers, the weaker felt
insecure and tried to undermine the strong by various means.
Throughout the second half of the eighteenth century France was
recognized as the largest single power in Europe. Her expan-
Bionlstlc ambitions alarmed her neighbors who, on different
occasions, Joined forces in order to hinder French acquisitions.
England, although unable to match France's power on the conti-
nent, was able, however, to build strength and prestige in her
overseas territories. England emerged in this period with the
largest colonial empire and her navy stood first in the world.
This naturally brought the enmity and jealousies of the other
maritime powers, Holland, Spain, and France, with whom England
shared a long history of rivalry for sea supremacy.
England, with long experience in the maintenance of her
security and Interests, came to definite conclusions. In the
first place, she decided to maintain sea supremacy and to hinder
the joining of other maritime powers against her. In the second
place, she attempted to satisfy her territorial interests in the
overseas areas and not on the continent. This gave her the ad-
vantage of being trusted by the continental land powers, who
could feel safe in asking for her help against other continental
powers. In the third place. Great Britain felt that her security
could not be maintained If a single power became predominant on
wthe continent. Therefore, England attempted to maintain a
balance of power on the continent. In the event that a power
would try to dominate, England at once would Join her opponents
in order to force that power to relinquish such schemes. In
the fourth place, she was particularly concerned about Holland.
The Dutch shores are very close to the southeastern coast of
Sngland. Hence, if a large power would control Holland, then
England would be in permanent danger. Also, the harbors of
Holland are deep and protective; thus large fleets could be em-
barked froB them. This would place England \inder a continuous
threat of invasion. Fui^heimore , the rivers meeting the sea in
Holland are navigable for a long distance and are of great com-
mercial importance to countries in central Europe, 'ilierefore,
the power controlling Holland would have great influence in that
area.
Understanding these basic tenets of British foreign policy
is the backbone for understanding the role of British foreign
policy toward the continent in the period of revolutionary wars.
England's outlook on the revolution was twofold. On the one
hand, she believed that the revolution might bring political
reforms and changes to the French pre-revolutionary expanslon-
istic policies. On the other hand and more Important, England
believed that the revolution would disable and undermine France's
strength. Hence, in regard to both considerations, the revolu-
tion seemed to be favorable to the British policies, and England,
therefore, had no desire to intervene in French internal affairs.
But the revolution proved both of the former points false. The
IXi
French revolutionary armies defeated both Austria and Prussia
and then they occupied the Low Countries. This latter act could
not be overlooked by England, and naturally, she at once decided
on war. England primarily did not go to war in opposition to
the revolution's principles but rather for political reasons
concerning her security.
The British line of policy in regard to the first Coalition
could be considered as a major reason for its collapse. The
British proved to be ignorant about France's ability to wage war.
This led them to the false proposition that France could be
easily defeated and that the war would be a short one. This In-
coz*rect Judgment led to some serious defeats for the allies.
England, misled by that idea, directed her energies to conquer-
ing the French colonies, leaving the main burden of the contin-
ental campaign to the Prussians and Austrians. This faulty
policy of the British did not only weaken the allied military
efforts in Flanders, but also brought complaints and mistrust
of England from her allies, who accused her of abandoning tha
common cause in favor of achieving selfish aims.
The British peace overtures to Franca in the period between
1795-1797 cannot be considered as proof of sincere British desire
for peace. Contrarywlse, the terms of peace proposed by the
British in the first overture in 1795 could be regarded as one
of a country who thought herself victorious in the war. The im-
practical terms were composed on the false view that France was
exhausted by the war and that she was ready to accept any terms.
Pitt, however, secure in the overtures, gained support for his
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war plans at home.
The formation of the Second Coalition was due to a combina-
tion of, first, French acts of aggression in 1798-1799, which
made the silence of the other powers no longer possible, and
second, to the skill of British diplomacy. Undoubtedly, the
adherence of Russia to the Coalition signified that skill of
the British. Russia was not eventually endangered by France
nor did she have any significant territorial ambitions to derive
from that war. She, nevertheless, was a decisive factor in the
first successes of the Coalition and then for its failure.
Again, as it was in the case of the First Coalition, there was
no ccncrete cooperation between the different allied plans and
military operations. The difference in aims also contributed
to the failure of the Second Coalition as it did in the First.
In this case it was mainly due to the selfishness of the Aus-
trians who tried to exploit the allied victories in Italy for
themselves, disregarding the wishes of the others. However,
some of the blame for this failure could be attributed to the
British. The British, as was th« case with Austria, mistreated
the Russian troops, and their campaign in Holland in 1799 was a
debit to their military operations.
In both Coalitions the British loans and subsidies played
an important part in the formation and conduct of their military
operations. It could be said that without British money it
would have been difficult for the idea of the Second Coalition
to materialixe. Hence, Pitt's administration would rightly be
appraised as being able, in spite of heavy war efforts, to
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Baintain the economy of the country In such a way as to enable
her to supply not only her military forces but those of her
allies as well.
Another significant point which could be mentioned about
British diplomatic activities in the period under discussion
was the clearness of luigland's main objectives of the war in the
minds of British policymakers, as well as the firmness and deter-
mination of these politicians to achieve these objects in times
when they seemed to be as far as the stars to the common man.
Most distinguished of these men were Lord Qrenville, Pitt, Lord
Auckland, Lord Malmesbury, and Whitworth.
It can be finally concluded that England In her struggle
against revolutionary France depended upon two major means:
diplomacy and her navy. If these means, up to 1799, were not
successful enough to cope with revolutionary France, they,
nevertheless, would be able eventually to win a final victory
over France in ldl5.
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The rivalry between England and France had been violent
throughout the eighteenth century. This rivalry was caused by
the desire for supremacy and predominance which signified most
of the major European wars of the eighteenth century. England
tried to build up an empire in overseas territories, while France
divided her energies between colonial activities and the attempt
to dominate the continent. On the other hand, the British for-
eign policy regarding the continent was to maintain a balance of
power by which no single European power would be permitted to
dominate the continent. If any continental power would attempt
to dominate the continent, England would at once Join forces
with the power's opponents.
By the Treaty of 17^3, England lost the United States and
much of her prestige in the councils of Europe. England, how-
ever, was able to counterbalance the French rising strength and
her Family Compact by concluding the Triple Alliance of 1788.
The English statesmen believed that the Revolution would weaken
France. England, therefore, assumed an attitude of neutrality
when war broke out between France and the First Coalition of
1792 with Austria, Prussia, Spain as its major members. This
attitude of England was soon changed to a hostile one when
Cemouriez defeated the allied armies and followed by occupying
the liow Countries. As a result, England believed that her se-
curity was threatened, and that the balance of power had shifted
for the advantage of France. England, therefore, at once Joined
the First Coalition in the Spring of the year 1793- The First
Coalition soon proved to be a failure because of the differences
In th« aims of the Allies, misjudgment of France's strength, and
the misconduct of the Allied military operations. England, who
wrongly thought that the war would be short, spent much of her
energies successfully attacking the French colonies. Her navy
was able to maintain its supremacy over that of the French. 'Ahen
the Coalition members deserted, England continued fighting alone
with her fleet as the only protector against a French invasion.
The purpose of the British peace overtures to France be-
tween 1795-1797 was to obtain peace and still maintain her over-
seas conquests. If these overtures failed, however, Pitt's
government would gain more support for its war effort. The
overtures failed as a result of the Impractical proposals of
the British and the uncompromising attitude of the French.
The Second Coalition was the basis for the Anglo-Russian
Alliance of December, 1793. Russia was to furnish troops, sub-
sidized by England, for the war against France. Distrust
prevented the conclusion of a similar treaty between England
and Austria. Prussia continued to remain neutral. The acts
of aggression of France in Italy, Switzerland , and the Mediter-
ranean, the Anglo-Russian Alliance, and the British victory in
the Battle of the Nile convinced Austria of the necessity of
her entering the war against France. On March 12, 1799, war
broke out and the armies of the Second Coalition met with
success in Italy and Germany, but they failed to defeat France.
This was due to the distrust between Austria, Russia, and Eng-
land which was increased by the selfish demand of Austria to
annex all of northern Italy, a demand contrary to the previous
plana of the Coalition. Tha Coalition further lacked coopera-
tion between its armies. Russia withdrew froa the war In
January, 1000, an act which waa a decisive blow to the Coalition.
The Second Coalition finally collapsed in the total defeat of
Austria by Bonaparte in IdOO.
